Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/wiley/international-telecom-settlements-gaming-incentives-carrier-alliances-JQMysX0AKI
References (21)
-
Mark Scanlan (1998)
Using call-back to demonstrate the discriminatory nature of the proportionate return ruleTelecommunications Policy, 22
-
David Malueg, M. Schwartz (1994)
Parallel imports, demand dispersion, and international price discrimination*Journal of International Economics, 37
-
T. Brennan (1990)
Cross-subsidization and cost misallocation by regulated monopolistsJournal of Regulatory Economics, 2
-
J. Laffont, P. Rey, J. Tirole (1998)
Network Competition: II. Price DiscriminationThe RAND Journal of Economics, 29
-
G. Stigler, P. Samuelson (1948)
Foundations of Economic Analysis.Journal of the American Statistical Association, 43
-
Julian Wright (1998)
International Telecommunications, Settlement Rates, and the FCCJournal of Regulatory Economics, 15
-
Y. Kato, D. Ypsilanti, Communications Policy (1997)
New technologies and their impact on the accounting rate system -
Pun-Lee Lam (1997)
Erosion of monopoly power by call-back. Lessons from Hong KongTelecommunications Policy, 21
-
Mark Scanlan (1996)
Why is the international accounting rate system in terminal decline, and what might be the consequences?Telecommunications Policy, 20
-
Peter Cowhey (1998)
FCC benchmarks and the reform of the international telecommunications marketTelecommunications Policy, 22
-
S. Wallsten (2001)
Telecommunications Investment and Traffic in Developing Countries: The Effects of International Settlement Rate ReformsJournal of Regulatory Economics, 20
-
Douglas Galbi (1998)
Cross-Border Rent Shifting in International TelecommunicationsInformation Economics and Policy, 10
-
Kenny Cheong, Mark Mullins (1991)
International telephone service imbalances: Accounting rates and regulatory policyTelecommunications Policy, 15
-
G. Huston (2003)
Interconnection, Peering and Settlements -
J. Laffont, P. Rey, J. Tirole (1998)
Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory PricingThe RAND Journal of Economics, 29
-
J. Tirole (1988)
The Theory of Industrial Organization -
M. Schwartz, E. Thompson (1986)
Divisionalization and Entry DeterrenceQuarterly Journal of Economics, 101
-
L. Johnson (1991)
Dealing with monopoly in international telephone service: a U.S. perspectiveInformation Economics and Policy, 4
-
R. Frieden (1998)
Falling through the cracks: International accounting rate reform at the ITU and WTOTelecommunications Policy, 22
-
P. Klemperer, Jeremy Bulow (1998)
The Tobacco DealLitigation
-
G. Libecap, S. Wiggins (1984)
Contractual Responses to the Common Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil ProductionThe American Economic Review, 74
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001
- ISSN
- 0022-1821
- eISSN
- 1467-6451
- DOI
- 10.1111/1467-6451.00153
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Liberalized countries that allow competition in international telecommunications favor traffic re‐routing practices as arbitrage against foreign monopolists. This view is seriously incomplete. Monopolists, allied with carriers in liberalized countries, can use these practices to reduce termination payments to nonalliance carriers??thereby harming also consumers in liberalized countries??by gaming regulations that require equal termination rates at both ends and ‘proportional return’ (the monopolist’s traffic is allocated among carriers in proportion to their shares of traffic to its country). We also present a simple bilateral settlements reform that eliminates gaming incentives and other proportional‐return distortions, yet benefits both countries.
Journal
The Journal of Industrial Economics – Wiley
Published: Sep 1, 2001