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Short Selling Around Seasoned Equity Offerings

Short Selling Around Seasoned Equity Offerings We use daily short-selling data to examine whether short selling around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) reflects informed or manipulative trading. Around SEO announcements, we find no evidence of informed short selling. Around issue dates, higher levels of pre-issue short selling are significantly related to larger issue discounts for non-shelf-registered offerings. This evidence is consistent with manipulative trading. We show that SEC Rule 105 constrains some but not all manipulative trading. Our results reverse previous research that uses monthly short-interest data, because daily data allow more powerful tests. Our evidence helps explain the increased popularity of shelf registrations. Although short selling usually enhances price efficiency, we document a situation where short selling reduces price efficiency. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Review of Financial Studies Oxford University Press

Short Selling Around Seasoned Equity Offerings

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Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org.
ISSN
0893-9454
eISSN
1465-7368
DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhq076
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We use daily short-selling data to examine whether short selling around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) reflects informed or manipulative trading. Around SEO announcements, we find no evidence of informed short selling. Around issue dates, higher levels of pre-issue short selling are significantly related to larger issue discounts for non-shelf-registered offerings. This evidence is consistent with manipulative trading. We show that SEC Rule 105 constrains some but not all manipulative trading. Our results reverse previous research that uses monthly short-interest data, because daily data allow more powerful tests. Our evidence helps explain the increased popularity of shelf registrations. Although short selling usually enhances price efficiency, we document a situation where short selling reduces price efficiency.

Journal

The Review of Financial StudiesOxford University Press

Published: Dec 21, 2010

Keywords: JEL G14 G32 G38

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