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- Publisher
- Springer Journals
- Copyright
- Copyright © 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
- Subject
- Economics; Industrial Organization; Microeconomics
- ISSN
- 0889-938X
- eISSN
- 1573-7160
- DOI
- 10.1023/A:1007705126893
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
This article focuses on testing the intuitive idea of Folk Theorem in a repeated game, and the existence of complementary bidding and incumbency premium. Through careful analysis of bidding behaviors in the Dallas-Ft. Worth (DFW) school-milk industry, I find that cooperation based on rationality and repetition satisfies the conditions for a kind of Folk Theorem. The data also strongly suggest that all major milk processors are engaged in complementary bidding to allocate consumers geographically and command statistically significant incumbency premia in their incumbent districts. Even if the equilibrium outcomes are largely non-cooperative, some pieces of circumstantial evidence uncovered in this school-milk market study may be sufficiently convincing to enable dispensing with evidence of actual communication.
Journal
Review of Industrial Organization – Springer Journals
Published: Oct 15, 2004