Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
(1958)
An Industry-Level Analysis of Import Relief Petitions Filed by US Manufacturers
Thomas Prusa (1992)
Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawnJournal of International Economics, 33
Michael Gallaway, Bruce Blonigen, Joseph Flynn (1999)
Welfare costs of the U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty lawsJournal of International Economics, 49
R. Staiger, F. Wolak (1990)
The Effect of Domestic Antidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign MonopolyLSN: Anti-Dumping Laws (Topic)
W. Hansen, Thomas Prusa (1997)
The Economics and Politics of Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of ITC Decision MakingReview of International Economics, 5
James Devault (1993)
Economics and the International Trade CommissionSouthern Economic Journal, 60
Corinne Krupp (1994)
Antidumping Cases in the U.S. Chemical Industry: A Panel Data ApproachJournal of Industrial Economics, 42
Michael Moore (1992)
RULES OR POLITICS?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ITC ANTI-DUMPING DECISIONSEconomic Inquiry, 30
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses, with ***, ** and * denoting statistical significance (two-tailed test) at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively
Multinomial logit estimation of first-stage determinants of U.S. AD case outcome probabilities. Dependent Variable: " 1 " if affirmative
K. Anderson (1993)
Agency Discretion or Statutory Direction: Decision Making at the U. S. International Trade CommissionThe Journal of Law and Economics, 36
James Anderson (1993)
Domino dumping II: Anti-dumpingJournal of International Economics, 35
(1996)
Antidumping Enforcement in a Reciprocal Model of Dumping: Theory and Evidence
James Anderson (1992)
Domino Dumping, I: Competitive ExportersThe American Economic Review, 82
Robert Feinberg, B. Hirsch (1989)
Industry rent seeking and the filing of ‘unfair trade’ complaintsInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 7
J. Finger, H. Hall, D. Nelson (1982)
The political economy of administered protectionThe American Economic Review, 72
(1999)
Antidumping Investigations and the Pass-Through of Exchange Rates and Antidumping Duties
M. Zanardi (2000)
Antidumping Law as a Collusive DeviceInternational Trade
J. Finger (1981)
The Industry-Country Incidence of "Less than Fair Value" Cases in US Import Trade
James Devault (1996)
U.S. antidumping administrative reviewsThe International Trade Journal, 10
Mark Herander, J. Schwartz (1984)
An Empirical Test of the Impact of the Threat of U. S. Trade Policy: The Case of Antidumping DutiesSouthern Economic Journal, 51
Barry Eichengreen, H. Ven (1983)
U.S. Antidumping Policies: The Case of SteelNBER Working Paper Series
H. Tan, H. Shimada (1994)
Troubled Industries in the United States and Japan
John Chubb (1985)
The Political Economy of FederalismAmerican Political Science Review, 79
R. Staiger, F. Wolak (1994)
Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States
Joseph Pattison (1984)
Antidumping and countervailing duty laws
Explanatory Variables Estimation for 1985 (using 1980- 1984 data) Estimation for 1990 (using 1980- 1989 data) Estimation for 1995 (using 1980- 1994 data) Determinants of affirmative outcomes
Corinne Krupp, P. Pollard (1996)
Market Responses to Antidumping Laws: Some Evidence from the U.S. Chemical IndustryCanadian Journal of Economics, 29
R. Baldwin (1985)
The political economy of U.S. import policy
W. Hansen (1990)
The International Trade Commission and the Politics of ProtectionismAmerican Political Science Review, 84
A. Pagan (1984)
Econometric Issues in the Analysis of Regressions with Generated Regressors.International Economic Review, 25
Antidumping (AD) trade protection policies allow government agencies to recalculate AD duties based on foreign firms' most recent pricing behavior. We examine the resulting dynamic pricing problem of a foreign firm facing such policy. We show that the expected pattern of AD duty recalculations over time crucially depends on the foreign firm's ex ante expectations of possible outcomes of AD policy enforcement. Our empirical analysis then confirms the role of ex ante expectations in explaining observed patterns of AD recalculations. Many of our model's results are applicable to other situations where enforcement of policy is tied to the subject's behavior.
American Economic Review – American Economic Association
Published: Mar 1, 2004
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.