<jats:p>This paper explores two quite different visions of the democratic processes that can create congruence between citizen preferences and public policies. In the<jats:italic>Majority Control vision</jats:italic>, electoral competition and citizen choices result in the direct election of governments committed to policies corresponding to the preferences of the median voter. In the<jats:italic>Proportionate Influence vision</jats:italic>, election outcomes result in legislatures that reflect the preferences of all citizens; legislative bargaining results in policies linked to the position of the median voter. The authors give more explicit theoretical form to those visions and link them empirically to specific types of modern democracies. They then attempt to test the success of each vision in bringing about congruence between citizen self-placements and the estimated positions of governments and policymaker coalitions on the left-right scale in twelve nations in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Although the analysis reveals weaknesses in each approach, it suggests a consistent advantage for the Proportionate Influence vision.</jats:p>