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Earnings Preannouncement Strategies

Earnings Preannouncement Strategies We examine the disclosure strategies managers follow when theyd “preannounce” quarterly earnings shortly before formal earnings announcements. We document that managers with bad news release essentially all of their news at the preannouncement date, while managers with good news only release about half of their news. Controlling for the combined news released at the preannouncement and earnings announcement dates, firms with negative earnings announcement surprises have significantly lower excess returns for the period from just before the preannouncement to just after the earnings announcement. This finding is consistent with the observed disclosure strategies whereby managers attempt to avoid negative earnings announcement surprises, and suggests that how information is presented can affect the market's reaction to that information. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Accounting Studies Springer Journals

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References (15)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Business and Management; Accounting/Auditing; Corporate Finance; Public Finance
ISSN
1380-6653
eISSN
1573-7136
DOI
10.1023/A:1009643517840
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We examine the disclosure strategies managers follow when theyd “preannounce” quarterly earnings shortly before formal earnings announcements. We document that managers with bad news release essentially all of their news at the preannouncement date, while managers with good news only release about half of their news. Controlling for the combined news released at the preannouncement and earnings announcement dates, firms with negative earnings announcement surprises have significantly lower excess returns for the period from just before the preannouncement to just after the earnings announcement. This finding is consistent with the observed disclosure strategies whereby managers attempt to avoid negative earnings announcement surprises, and suggests that how information is presented can affect the market's reaction to that information.

Journal

Review of Accounting StudiesSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 16, 2004

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