Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
A. Kyle (1985)
Continuous Auctions and Insider TradingEconometrica, 53
J. Stiglitz (1981)
Information and Capital MarketsCapital Markets: Asset Pricing & Valuation eJournal
Kreps Kreps, Robert Robert (1982)
Sequential equilibriaEconometrica, 50
I. Welch (1989)
Seasoned Offerings, Imitation Costs, and the Underpricing of Initial Public OfferingsJournal of Finance, 44
Sanford Grossman, Motty Perry (1986)
Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric InformationWharton School: Finance (Topic)
Mark Grinblatt, C. Hwang (1989)
Signalling and the Pricing of New IssuesJournal of Finance, 44
H. Leland., David Pyle. (1977)
INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATIONJournal of Finance, 32
ABSTRACT The ability of capital markets to distinguish firms of different value by the size of their initial equity offerings is attenuated when insiders can sell equity more than once. A model is developed in which there is price risk from holding equity between periods. When the uncertainty is small, there must be pooling in the first period. When uncertainty is large, the pooling equilibria dominate the separating equilibrium.
The Journal of Finance – Wiley
Published: Jun 1, 1989
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.