Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.
Abstract Six months after the market crash of October 1987, we are still sifting through the debris searching for its cause. Two theories of the crash sound plausible -- one based on a market panic and the other based on large trader transactions -- though there is other evidence that is difficult to reconcile. If we are to believe the market panic theory or the Brady Commission's theory that the crash was primarily caused by a few large traders, we must strongly reject the standard model. We need to build models of financial equilibrium which are more sensitive to real life trading mechanisms, which account more realistically for the formation of expectations, and which recognize that, at any one time, there is a limited pool of investors available with the ability to evaluate stocks and take appropriate action in the market.
Journal of Economic Perspectives – American Economic Association
Published: Aug 1, 1988
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.