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Corporate governance and firm value during a financial crisis

Corporate governance and firm value during a financial crisis The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effects of management ownership and other corporate governance variables on Hong Kong firms’ stock performance following the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–98). Our results show that Hong Kong firms with a more concentrated management (executive board) ownership displayed better capital market performance during the 13-month period of the Crisis. We also find that firms with more equity ownership by non-executive directors, and in which the positions of CEO and board chairperson were occupied by the same individual experienced a smaller stock price decline. Our findings are consistent with the notion that there is a greater alignment of insiders with outside owners, rather than the expropriation by insiders who have the opportunity to divert value, for firms with higher levels of management ownership during an unexpected capital market crisis. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Springer Journals

Corporate governance and firm value during a financial crisis

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References (71)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2009 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Subject
Finance; Corporate Finance; Accounting/Auditing; Econometrics; Operation Research/Decision Theory
ISSN
0924-865X
eISSN
1573-7179
DOI
10.1007/s11156-009-0141-z
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effects of management ownership and other corporate governance variables on Hong Kong firms’ stock performance following the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–98). Our results show that Hong Kong firms with a more concentrated management (executive board) ownership displayed better capital market performance during the 13-month period of the Crisis. We also find that firms with more equity ownership by non-executive directors, and in which the positions of CEO and board chairperson were occupied by the same individual experienced a smaller stock price decline. Our findings are consistent with the notion that there is a greater alignment of insiders with outside owners, rather than the expropriation by insiders who have the opportunity to divert value, for firms with higher levels of management ownership during an unexpected capital market crisis.

Journal

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting – Springer Journals

Published: Jul 24, 2009

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