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- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2004 by the American Economic Association
- Subject
- Articles
- ISSN
- 0022-0515
- DOI
- 10.1257/0022051043004586
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Abstract This is a review article of Putting Auction Theory to Work (Cambridge University Press 2004) by Paul Milgrom.
Journal
Journal of Economic Literature – American Economic Association
Published: Dec 1, 2004