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- Publisher
- Springer Journals
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2005 by Springer Science + Business Media, Inc.
- Subject
- Business and Management; Operation Research/Decision Theory; Combinatorics; Theory of Computation
- ISSN
- 0254-5330
- eISSN
- 1572-9338
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10479-005-2258-3
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
In this work, we consider a public facility allocation problem decided through a voting process under the majority rule. A location of the public facility is a majority rule winner if there is no other location in the network where more than half of the voters would have been closer to than the majority rule winner. We develop fast algorithms for interesting cases with nice combinatorial structures. We show that the computing problem and the decision problem in the general case, where the number of public facilities is more than one and is considered part of the input size, are all NP-hard. Finally, we discuss majority rule decision making for related models.
Journal
Annals of Operations Research – Springer Journals
Published: Jan 1, 2005