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MERGERS, ANTITRUST LAW ENFORCEMENT AND STOCKHOLDER RETURNS

MERGERS, ANTITRUST LAW ENFORCEMENT AND STOCKHOLDER RETURNS MAY 1976 MERGERS, ANTITRUST LAW ENFORCEMENT AND STOCKHOLDER RETURNS JAMES C. ELLERT· THE CELLER-KEFAUVER AMENDMENT of 1950 revitalized the antimerger statute contained in Section 7 of the Clayton Act.' An unparalleled wave of merger activity after this revision [17] was accompanied by an acceleration of antimerger law enforcement activities [21]. Notwithstanding the importance of these developments, there has been no systematic attempt to ascertain the effects of the enforcement experience on the wealth position of affected stockholders. This paper examines the risk and return characteristics of 205 large corporations whose merger activities were challenged by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission over the period 1950-1972. The stock price and dividend records of these companies are examined for evidence of abnormal rate of return behaviour before and after the issuance of Section 7 complaints. The impact of the divestiture program is studied and comparisons are made to the returns realized by stockholders in companies whose merger activity was not challenged under the antitrust law. The following section presents some competing hypotheses on the relationships between merger activity, antitrust enforcement and the pattern of stockholder returns. Research methodology, data sources, and sample selection http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Finance Wiley

MERGERS, ANTITRUST LAW ENFORCEMENT AND STOCKHOLDER RETURNS

The Journal of Finance , Volume 31 (2) – May 1, 1976

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References (21)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
1976 The American Finance Association
ISSN
0022-1082
eISSN
1540-6261
DOI
10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01916.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

MAY 1976 MERGERS, ANTITRUST LAW ENFORCEMENT AND STOCKHOLDER RETURNS JAMES C. ELLERT· THE CELLER-KEFAUVER AMENDMENT of 1950 revitalized the antimerger statute contained in Section 7 of the Clayton Act.' An unparalleled wave of merger activity after this revision [17] was accompanied by an acceleration of antimerger law enforcement activities [21]. Notwithstanding the importance of these developments, there has been no systematic attempt to ascertain the effects of the enforcement experience on the wealth position of affected stockholders. This paper examines the risk and return characteristics of 205 large corporations whose merger activities were challenged by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission over the period 1950-1972. The stock price and dividend records of these companies are examined for evidence of abnormal rate of return behaviour before and after the issuance of Section 7 complaints. The impact of the divestiture program is studied and comparisons are made to the returns realized by stockholders in companies whose merger activity was not challenged under the antitrust law. The following section presents some competing hypotheses on the relationships between merger activity, antitrust enforcement and the pattern of stockholder returns. Research methodology, data sources, and sample selection

Journal

The Journal of FinanceWiley

Published: May 1, 1976

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