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Order preferencing, adverse-selection costs, and the probability of information-based trading

Order preferencing, adverse-selection costs, and the probability of information-based trading Although prior studies offer various conjectures on the causes and consequences of order preferencing, there is only limited empirical evidence. In this study, we show that the extent of order preferencing is significantly and negatively related to both the adverse-selection component of the spread and the probability of information-based trading. This result is consistent with the prediction of the clientele-pricing hypothesis that dealers (brokers) selectively purchase (internalize) orders based on information content. Our results suggest that order preferencing may not be as harmful as some researchers have suggested and offer some rationale for its prevalence in securities markets with heterogeneously informed traders. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Springer Journals

Order preferencing, adverse-selection costs, and the probability of information-based trading

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References (29)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 by Springer Science + Business Media, LLC
Subject
Finance; Corporate Finance; Accounting/Auditing; Econometrics; Operation Research/Decision Theory
ISSN
0924-865X
eISSN
1573-7179
DOI
10.1007/s11156-006-0042-3
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Although prior studies offer various conjectures on the causes and consequences of order preferencing, there is only limited empirical evidence. In this study, we show that the extent of order preferencing is significantly and negatively related to both the adverse-selection component of the spread and the probability of information-based trading. This result is consistent with the prediction of the clientele-pricing hypothesis that dealers (brokers) selectively purchase (internalize) orders based on information content. Our results suggest that order preferencing may not be as harmful as some researchers have suggested and offer some rationale for its prevalence in securities markets with heterogeneously informed traders.

Journal

Review of Quantitative Finance and AccountingSpringer Journals

Published: Jan 1, 2006

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