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F. Menezes, P. Monteiro (2000)
Auctions with endogenous participationReview of Economic Design, 5
H. Ohashi (2009)
Effects of Transparency in Procurement Practices on Government Expenditure: A Case Study of Municipal Public WorksReview of Industrial Organization, 34
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Are private equity consortia anticompetitive? The economics of club bidding
Roberto Burguet, Yeon-Koo Che (2004)
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Ten years of water service reform in Latin America: toward an Anglo-French model
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Antonio Estache, Atsushi Iimi (2008)
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Joint Bidding, Governance and Public Procurement Costs: A Case of Road ProjectsWiley-Blackwell: Annals of Public & Cooperative Economics
Atsushi Iimi (2006)
Auction Reforms for Effective Official Development AssistanceReview of Industrial Organization, 28
Patrick Bajari (2007)
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Competition and collusion in a government procurement auction marketAtlantic Economic Journal, 30
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Asymmetric Auctions
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Daniel Benitez, A. Estache (2005)
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Dakshina Silva, T. Dunne, Georgia Kosmopoulou (2003)
An Empirical Analysis of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in Road Construction AuctionsIO: Theory
Asymmetric auctions are among the most rapidly growing areas in the auction literature. The potential benefits from intensified auction competition could be enormous in the public procurement context. Entrant bidders are considered a key to enhance competition and break potential collusive arrangements among incumbent bidders. Asymmetric auction theory predicts that weak (fringe) bidders would bid more aggressively when they are faced with a strong (incumbent) opponent. Using data from official development projects, this paper shows that entrants actually submitted aggressive bids in the presence of incumbent(s) in the road sector and to a certain extent in the water sector. For electricity projects, the general competition effect is found to be particularly significant, but the entrant effect remains unclear. The results suggest that auctioneers should foster competition in public procurement, including fringe bidders, to contain public infrastructure investment costs.
Review of Industrial Organization – Springer Journals
Published: Feb 21, 2010
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