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Cognitive Science: Definition, Status, and Questions

Cognitive Science: Definition, Status, and Questions becomes essential. Information-processing studies deal with two somewhat different ques­ tions. What sort of language is mentalese , and what problem-solving regular­ ities are expressed in it? For ease of reference, this will be called the syntactic issue. What sort of primitive operations are available to manipulate mentalese data structures, and how do they fit together? This will be called the system architecture issue. The two issues are discussed in more detail below. First, though, I consider some of the philosophic issues raised by the cognitive science view. PHILOSOPHIC ISSUES Syntactical and Semantic Models for Thought Regularities are stated in different ways in information-processing and repre­ sentational theories. If the regularity is at the information-processing level it should be stated as an operation on structures defined by the syntax of mentalese. If the regularity is at the representational level it should be stated in the semantics of the problem-solving domain. To see the difference be­ tween the two types of laws , consider these problem-solving rules, which are paraphrased from 1. R. Anderson's (1983, pp. 162-65) discussion of problem solving in plane geometry. HUNT 1. IF the goal is to produce an (internal mentalese) structure of type Z, http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Annual Review of Psychology Annual Reviews

Cognitive Science: Definition, Status, and Questions

Hunt, E
Annual Review of Psychology , Volume 40 (1) – Feb 1, 1989
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Publisher
Annual Reviews
Copyright
Copyright 1989 Annual Reviews. All rights reserved
Subject
Review Articles
ISSN
0066-4308
eISSN
1545-2085
DOI
10.1146/annurev.ps.40.020189.003131
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

becomes essential. Information-processing studies deal with two somewhat different ques­ tions. What sort of language is mentalese , and what problem-solving regular­ ities are expressed in it? For ease of reference, this will be called the syntactic issue. What sort of primitive operations are available to manipulate mentalese data structures, and how do they fit together? This will be called the system architecture issue. The two issues are discussed in more detail below. First, though, I consider some of the philosophic issues raised by the cognitive science view. PHILOSOPHIC ISSUES Syntactical and Semantic Models for Thought Regularities are stated in different ways in information-processing and repre­ sentational theories. If the regularity is at the information-processing level it should be stated as an operation on structures defined by the syntax of mentalese. If the regularity is at the representational level it should be stated in the semantics of the problem-solving domain. To see the difference be­ tween the two types of laws , consider these problem-solving rules, which are paraphrased from 1. R. Anderson's (1983, pp. 162-65) discussion of problem solving in plane geometry. HUNT 1. IF the goal is to produce an (internal mentalese) structure of type Z,

Journal

Annual Review of Psychology – Annual Reviews

Published: Feb 1, 1989

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