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Abstract. The Securities and Exchange Commission requires disclosure of auditor‐client disagreements that precede a change in auditor. Although prior research has documented that disclosure of disagreements is associated with a decline in equity value, no empirical work has examined factors that result in auditor‐client disagreements. We hypothesize that managers are motivated by debt and compensation arrangements to propose methods that are objected to by their auditors (resulting in a disagreement). Because of their greater independence, we also hypothesize that reported disagreements will be more likely for Big Eight (now Big Six) auditors, A comparison of 40 firms that changed auditors and reported a disagreement with a control group of 40 firms that simply changed auditors revealed that disagreement firms are more likely to have debt covenant violations. Disagreement firms are also more likely to have higher leverage, a decline in earnings, and Big Eight auditors. For firms that disclosed the magnitude of the disagreement's effect on earnings, the use of the questionable procedure tended to enhance “flat” earnings growth. Résumé. La Securities and Exchange Commission exige que soit publiée l'information relative aux désaccords vérificateur‐client qui précèdent un changement de vérificateurs. Bien que les recherches antérieures aient démontré que la publication de cette information est accompagnée d'un déclin de la valeur des titres, aucun travail empirique n'a examiné les facteurs qui sont à l'origine des désaccords vérificateur‐client. Les auteurs posent l'hypothèse selon laquelle ce sont le passif et les régimes de rémunération qui motivent les gestionnaires à proposer des méthodes auxquelles s'opposent les vérificateurs (et qui donnent lieu à un désaccord). Les auteurs posent également l'hypothèse selon laquelle il est plus probable que les désaccords déclarés mettent en cause les huit grands cabinets d'experts‐comptables (maintenant les six grands), étant donné leur indépendance plus grande. La comparaison de 40 entreprises ayant changé de vérificateurs et fait état d'un désaccord à un groupe de contrôle de 40 entreprises ayant simplement changé de vérificateurs a révélé que les entreprises en désaccord sont davantage susceptibles d'avoir dérogé à des clauses restrictives. Les entreprises qui déclarent être en désaccord avec leurs vérificateurs sont aussi davantage susceptibles d'être caractérisées par un levier financier élevé, un déclin dans les bénéfices et le recours aux services d'un cabinet d'experts‐comptables appartenant aux huit grands. Dans le cas des entreprises qui ont fait état de l'ampleur des conséquences du désaccord sur les bénéfices, l'utilisation du procédé discutable a eu tendance à favoriser une croissance « horizontale » des bénéfices.
Contemporary Accounting Research – Wiley
Published: Mar 1, 1993
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