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I. INTRODUCTION The purpose of this essay is to survey the emerging theory of the rent-seeking society. The initial problem is to clarify terminology. Rent is a venerable concept in economics. Defined as a return in excess of a resource ownerâs opportunity cost, economic rent has played a prominent role in the history of economic analysis (âcorn is not high because rent is paid, rent is paid because corn is highâ). In this sense it is a fair guess that most economists would consider ârent seekingâ to be equivalent to âprofit seekingâ, whereby it is meant that the expectation of excess returns motivates valueincreasing activities in the economy. Such excess returns (positive and negative) are typically viewed as short-lived (quasi-rents) because competition will drive them to normal levels. The competitive dissipation of rents, however, is not what is meant by ârent seekingâ. Rents emanate from two sources. They arise naturally in the price system by, for example, shifts in demand and supply curves. The pursuit of rents under these circumstances is the sense in which rent seeking is equivalent to profit seeking. Rents can also be contrived artificially through, for example, government action. The fact that rents are
Kyklos International Review of Social Sciences – Wiley
Published: Nov 1, 1982
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