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On the Feasibility of a Liberal Welfare State: Agency and Exit Costs in Income Security Clubs

On the Feasibility of a Liberal Welfare State: Agency and Exit Costs in Income Security Clubs This paper investigates whether individuals might voluntarily join and remain members of a state in which high levels of social insurance are provided. That is to say, are there plausible circumstances in which a social welfare state can be regarded as “liberal” in the sense that it has the universal support of its citizens? http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Constitutional Political Economy Springer Journals

On the Feasibility of a Liberal Welfare State: Agency and Exit Costs in Income Security Clubs

Congleton, Roger
Constitutional Political Economy , Volume 18 (3) – Jul 26, 2007
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References (27)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2007 by Springer Science + Business Media, LLC
Subject
Political Science and International Relations; Political Science; Constitutional Law; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
ISSN
1043-4062
eISSN
1572-9966
DOI
10.1007/s10602-007-9018-0
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper investigates whether individuals might voluntarily join and remain members of a state in which high levels of social insurance are provided. That is to say, are there plausible circumstances in which a social welfare state can be regarded as “liberal” in the sense that it has the universal support of its citizens?

Journal

Constitutional Political Economy – Springer Journals

Published: Jul 26, 2007

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