Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
(1994)
Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management
J. Schumpeter (1943)
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy
Michael Ryngaert (1988)
The effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealthJournal of Financial Economics, 20
B. Nalebuff, J. Stiglitz (1983)
Information, Competition, and MarketsThe American Economic Review, 73
Malcolm Sawyer (1979)
Theories of the firm
C. Phillips (1971)
Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance
Hurvey Leibenstein (1966)
Allocative efficiency vs. X-EfficiencyThe American Economic Review, 56
Benjamin Hermalin (1992)
Heterogeneity in Organizational Form: Why Otherwise Identical Firms Choose Different Incentives for Their ManagersThe RAND Journal of Economics, 25
F. Machlup (1978)
THEORIES OF THE FIRM: MARGINALIST, BEHAVIORAL, MANAGERIAL
John Harsanyi, Reinhard Selten (1989)
Общая теория выбора равновесия в играх / A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games
Michael Barclay, C. Holderness (1989)
Private benefits from control of public corporationsJournal of Financial Economics, 25
Wesley Cohen, R. Levin (1989)
Empirical studies of innovation and market structureHandbook of Industrial Organization, 2
Stephen Martin (1993)
Endogenous Firm Efficiency in a Cournot Principal-Agent ModelJournal of Economic Theory, 59
Luís Cabral, M. Riordan (1989)
Incentives for cost reduction under price cap regulationJournal of Regulatory Economics, 1
Michael Jensen, W. Meckling (1976)
Harvard Business School; SSRN; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Harvard University - Accounting & Control UnitLSN: Law & Finance: Empirical (Topic)
J. Vickers (1995)
Concepts of Competition
Benjamin Hermalin (1992)
The Effects of Competition on Executive BehaviorThe RAND Journal of Economics, 23
M. Jelinek, M. Porter (1990)
The Competitive Advantage of Nations.Administrative Science Quarterly, 37
Bengt Holmstrom (1982)
Moral Hazard in TeamsThe Bell Journal of Economics, 13
D. Scharfstein (1988)
Product-Market Competition and Managerial SlackThe RAND Journal of Economics, 19
Paul Malatesta, Ralph Walkling (1988)
Poison pill securities: Stockholder wealth, profitability, and ownership structureJournal of Financial Economics, 20
S. Yoo (1991)
Technical efficiency in Korea
R. Innes (1990)
Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choicesJournal of Economic Theory, 52
R. Willig (1987)
Corporate Governance and Market Structure
The paper shows that an increase in competition has two effects on managerial incentives: It increases the probability of liquidation, which has a positive effect on managerial effort, but it also reduces the firm's profits, which may make it less attractive to induce high effort. Thus, the total effect is ambiguous.I identify natural circumstances where increasing competition unambiguously reduces managerial slack. In general, however, this relation need not be monotonic. A simple example demonstrates that—starting from a monopoly—managerial effort may increase as additional competitors enter the market, but will eventually decrease when competition becomes too intense.
The Review of Economic Studies – Oxford University Press
Published: Apr 1, 1997
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.