Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Unconditional security in quantum cryptography

Unconditional security in quantum cryptography Basic techniques to prove the unconditional security of quantum crypto graphy are described. They are applied to a quantum key distribution protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard 1984. The proof considers a practical variation on the protocol in which the channel is noisy and photos may be lost during the transmission. Each individual signal sent into the channel must contain a single photon or any two-dimensional system in the exact state described in the protocol. No restriction is imposed on the detector used at the receiving side of the channel, except that whether or not the received system is detected must be independent of the basis used to measure this system. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of the ACM (JACM) Association for Computing Machinery

Unconditional security in quantum cryptography

Journal of the ACM (JACM) , Volume 48 (3) – May 1, 2001

Loading next page...
 
/lp/association-for-computing-machinery/unconditional-security-in-quantum-cryptography-44z00cZLQ1

References

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2001 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
0004-5411
DOI
10.1145/382780.382781
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Basic techniques to prove the unconditional security of quantum crypto graphy are described. They are applied to a quantum key distribution protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard 1984. The proof considers a practical variation on the protocol in which the channel is noisy and photos may be lost during the transmission. Each individual signal sent into the channel must contain a single photon or any two-dimensional system in the exact state described in the protocol. No restriction is imposed on the detector used at the receiving side of the channel, except that whether or not the received system is detected must be independent of the basis used to measure this system.

Journal

Journal of the ACM (JACM)Association for Computing Machinery

Published: May 1, 2001

References