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Matching and Money

Matching and Money By DEAN CORBAE, TED TEMZELIDES, In Corbae, Temzelides, and Wright (2001) (hereafter, CTW) we proposed a new version of the framework that uses bilateral matching to model the exchange process, and in particular to model the use of money as a medium of exchange. Our version does not have agents meeting exogenously and at random, but rather has agents meeting endogenously. That is, agents are matched at each date subject to a stability condition that requires, roughly, that no agents prefer to be paired with each other or to be unmatched, rather than to be paired with the partners they get along the equilibrium path. While similar in spirit to the cooperative matching concept introduced by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley (1962), we had to generalize their framework to dynamic models because we are interested in monetary economics. Here we present a version of the solution concept in CTW, specialized in some ways but also generalized to include extrinsic uncertainty (sunspots). We then discuss some applications of endogenous matching models to issues that have previously been addressed using random matching, including the existence of sunspot equilibria and the efficiency of inside versus outside money. One of our main http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Review American Economic Association

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2002 by the American Economic Association
Subject
Frameworks for Monetary Economics
ISSN
0002-8282
DOI
10.1257/000282802320189023
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

By DEAN CORBAE, TED TEMZELIDES, In Corbae, Temzelides, and Wright (2001) (hereafter, CTW) we proposed a new version of the framework that uses bilateral matching to model the exchange process, and in particular to model the use of money as a medium of exchange. Our version does not have agents meeting exogenously and at random, but rather has agents meeting endogenously. That is, agents are matched at each date subject to a stability condition that requires, roughly, that no agents prefer to be paired with each other or to be unmatched, rather than to be paired with the partners they get along the equilibrium path. While similar in spirit to the cooperative matching concept introduced by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley (1962), we had to generalize their framework to dynamic models because we are interested in monetary economics. Here we present a version of the solution concept in CTW, specialized in some ways but also generalized to include extrinsic uncertainty (sunspots). We then discuss some applications of endogenous matching models to issues that have previously been addressed using random matching, including the existence of sunspot equilibria and the efficiency of inside versus outside money. One of our main

Journal

American Economic ReviewAmerican Economic Association

Published: May 1, 2002

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