Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
M. Darrough, N. Stoughton (1990)
Financial disclosure policy in an entry gameJournal of Accounting and Economics, 12
(2007)
http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained
(2001)
Essays on disclosure
Ilan Guttman, Ohad Kadan, Eugene Kandel (2006)
A Rational Expectations Theory of Kinks in Financial ReportingFEN: Behavioral Finance (Topic)
Evelyn Korn, Ulf Schiller (2002)
Voluntary Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information: A Complete Equilibrium Characterization
Ralf Ewert, Alfred Wagenhofer (2005)
Economic Effects of Tightening Accounting Standards to Restrict Earnings ManagementAccounting review: A quarterly journal of the American Accounting Association, 80
Paul Fischer, Phillip Stocken (2004)
Effect of Investor Speculation on Earnings ManagementJournal of Accounting Research, 42
R. Dye (1986)
Proprietary and Nonproprietary DisclosuresThe Journal of Business, 59
Eti Einhorn, Amir Ziv (2007)
Unbalanced Information and the Interaction between Information Acquisition, Operating Activities, and Voluntary DisclosureThe Accounting Review, 82
R. Dye (2001)
An Evaluation of 'Essays on Disclosure' and the Disclosure Literature in AccountingJournal of Accounting and Economics, 32
Michael Kirschenheiter (1997)
Information Quality and Correlated SignalsJournal of Accounting Research, 35
P Milgrom (1981)
Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and applicationsBell Journal of Economics, 12
H. Shin (1994)
News Management and the Value of FirmsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 25
Eti Einhorn (2007)
Voluntary Disclosure Under Uncertainty About the Reporting ObjectiveJournal of Accounting and Economics, 43
In-Koo Cho, David Kreps (1987)
Signaling Games and Stable EquilibriaQuarterly Journal of Economics, 102
Evelyn Korn (2004)
Voluntary Disclosure of Partially Verifiable InformationSchmalenbach Business Review, 56
Michael Fishman, K. Hagerty (1997)
Mandatory vs. Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed CustomersIndustrial Organization & Regulation eJournal
E Einhorn (2005)
The nature of the interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosuresJournal of Accounting Research, 43
RA Dye, SS Sridhar (2004)
Reliability-relevance trade-offs and the efficiency of aggregationJournal of Accounting Research, 42
Suil Pae (2005)
Selective disclosures in the presence of uncertainty about information endowmentJournal of Accounting and Economics, 39
Boyan Jovanovic (1982)
Truthful Disclosure of InformationThe Bell Journal of Economics, 13
V. Crawford, J. Sobel (1982)
STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSIONEconometrica, 50
E. Kohlberg, J. Mertens (1986)
ON THE STRATEGIC STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIAEconometrica, 54
(2000)
Reporting bias
R. Dye, S. Sridhar (2004)
Reliability-Relevance Trade-Offs and the Efficiency of AggregationConsequences of Leadership eJournal
Alfred Wagenhofer (1990)
Voluntary disclosure with a strategic opponentJournal of Accounting and Economics, 12
(1979)
Informational equilibrium
Sanford Grossman (1981)
The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product QualityThe Journal of Law and Economics, 24
Nahum Melumad, Toshi Shibano (1991)
Communication in settings with no transfersThe RAND Journal of Economics, 22
In-Koo Cho, J. Sobel (1990)
Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling gamesJournal of Economic Theory, 50
R. Dye (1985)
DISCLOSURE OF NONPROPRIETARY INFORMATIONJournal of Accounting Research, 23
RE Verrecchia (1983)
Discretionary disclosureJournal of Accounting and Economics, 5
A. Beyer, Ilan Guttman (2012)
Voluntary Disclosure, Manipulation and Real EffectsERN: Information Asymmetry Models (Topic)
Eti Einhorn (2004)
The Nature of the Interaction between Mandatory and Voluntary DisclosuresBehavioral & Experimental Economics
M Fishman, K Hagerty (2003)
Mandatory vs. voluntary disclosure in markets with informed and uninformed customersJournal of Law Economics and Organization, 19
Woon‐Oh Jung, Y. Kwon (1988)
Disclosure When The Market Is Unsure Of Information Endowment Of ManagersJournal of Accounting Research, 26
Nisan Langberg, S. Sivaramakrishnan (2007)
Voluntary Disclosures and Information Production By AnalystsMutual Funds
Michael Kirschenheiter, Nahum Melumad (2002)
Can "Big Bath" and Earnings Smoothing Co-exist as Equilibrium Financial Reporting Strategies?Journal of Accounting Research, 40
Venky Nagar (1999)
The Role of the Manager?S Human Capital in Discretionary DisclosureJournal of Accounting Research, 37
J. Stein (1989)
Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate BehaviorQuarterly Journal of Economics, 104
Y. Kwon, P. Newman, Yoonseok Zang (2009)
The Effects of Accounting Report Quality on the Bias in and Likelihood of Management DisclosuresSingapore Management University School of Accountancy Research Paper Series
J. Banks, J. Sobel (1987)
Equilibrium Selection in Signaling GamesEconometrica, 55
R. Dye (1988)
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN AN OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODELJournal of Accounting Research, 26
J. Suijs (2007)
Voluntary disclosure of information when firms are uncertain of investor responseJournal of Accounting and Economics, 43
N Langberg, S Sivaramakrishnan (2008)
Voluntary disclosure and information production by analystsJournal of Accounting and Economics, 46
Eti Einhorn, Amir Ziv (2008)
Intertemporal Dynamics of Corporate Voluntary DisclosuresJournal of Accounting Research, 46
M. Sampford (1953)
Some Inequalities on Mill's Ratio and Related FunctionsAnnals of Mathematical Statistics, 24
Phillip Stocken (2000)
Credibility of Voluntary DisclosureThe RAND Journal of Economics, 31
Sanford Grossman, O. Hart (1980)
Disclosure Laws and Takeover BidsJournal of Finance, 35
We provide a bridge between the voluntary disclosure and the earnings management literature. Voluntary disclosure models focus on managers’ discretion in deciding whether or not to provide truthful voluntary disclosure to the capital market. Earnings management models, on the other hand, concentrate on managers’ discretion in deciding how to bias their mandatory disclosure. By analyzing managers’ disclosure strategy when disclosure is voluntary and not necessarily truthful, we show the robustness of voluntary disclosure theory to the relaxation of the standard assumption of truthful reporting. We also demonstrate the sensitivity of earnings management theory to the commonly made mandatory disclosure assumption.
Review of Accounting Studies – Springer Journals
Published: Dec 8, 2011
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.