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Defensive Changes in Corporate Payout Policy: Share Repurchases and Special Dividends

Defensive Changes in Corporate Payout Policy: Share Repurchases and Special Dividends ABSTRACT This paper examines defensive payouts announced in response to hostile corporate control activity. The evidence indicates that the announcement of defensive share repurchases is associated with an average negative impact on the share price of the target firm. In contrast, special dividend payments generally increase the wealth of target firm shareholders. Regardless of payout type, those firms remaining independent after the outcome of the corporate control contest experience an abnormal share price increase over the duration of the contest. Among these firms there are substantial post‐contest changes in capital, asset, and ownership structure and abnormally high rates of top management turnover. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Finance Wiley

Defensive Changes in Corporate Payout Policy: Share Repurchases and Special Dividends

The Journal of Finance , Volume 45 (5) – Dec 1, 1990

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References (33)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
1990 The American Finance Association
ISSN
0022-1082
eISSN
1540-6261
DOI
10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb03722.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper examines defensive payouts announced in response to hostile corporate control activity. The evidence indicates that the announcement of defensive share repurchases is associated with an average negative impact on the share price of the target firm. In contrast, special dividend payments generally increase the wealth of target firm shareholders. Regardless of payout type, those firms remaining independent after the outcome of the corporate control contest experience an abnormal share price increase over the duration of the contest. Among these firms there are substantial post‐contest changes in capital, asset, and ownership structure and abnormally high rates of top management turnover.

Journal

The Journal of FinanceWiley

Published: Dec 1, 1990

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