Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
S. Penman (1980)
An Empirical-Investigation Of The Voluntary Disclosure Of Corporate-Earnings ForecastsJournal of Accounting Research, 18
A. Chambers, S. Penman (1984)
Timeliness Of Reporting And The Stock-Price Reaction To Earnings AnnouncementsJournal of Accounting Research, 22
Ronald King, David Wallin (1990)
The effects of antifraud rules and ex post verifiability on managerial disclosuresContemporary Accounting Research, 6
R. Thaler (1988)
Anomalies: The Winner's CurseJournal of Economic Perspectives, 2
(2007)
http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained
Paul Milgrom, John Roberts (1985)
Relying on the Information of Interested PartiesThe RAND Journal of Economics, 17
R. Dye (1985)
DISCLOSURE OF NONPROPRIETARY INFORMATIONJournal of Accounting Research, 23
V. Smith (1982)
Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental ScienceThe American Economic Review, 72
Gregory Waymire (1985)
Earnings Volatility And Voluntary Management Forecast DisclosureJournal of Accounting Research, 23
Aumann Aumann (1976)
Agreeing to DisagreeAnn Statist, 4
William Kross, Douglas Schroeder (1984)
An Empirical-Investigation Of The Effect Of Quarterly Earnings Announcement Timing On Stock ReturnsJournal of Accounting Research, 22
Bipin Ajinkya, Michael Gift (1984)
Corporate Managers' Earnings Forecasts and Symmetrical Adjustments of Market ExpectationsJournal of Accounting Research, 22
N. Dopuch (1989)
The impact of regulations on financial accounting researchContemporary Accounting Research, 5
Robert Forsythe, R. Isaac, T. Palfrey (1989)
Theories and Tests of Blind Bidding in Sealed-bid AuctionsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 20
D. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, Russell Lundholm, Wilfred Uecker (1985)
A Laboratory Investigation Of The Moral Hazard Problem In An Agency RelationshipJournal of Accounting Research, 23
C. Plott, S. Sunder (1982)
Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider Information: An Application of Rational-Expectations ModelsJournal of Political Economy, 90
B. Lev, S. Penman (1990)
VOLUNTARY FORECAST DISCLOSURE, NONDISCLOSURE, AND STOCK-PRICESJournal of Accounting Research, 28
Steven Matthews, Andrew Postlewaite (1985)
Quality Testing and DisclosureThe RAND Journal of Economics, 16
Ross Miller, C. Plott (1985)
Product Quality Signaling in Experimental MarketsEconometrica, 53
Sanford Grossman (1981)
The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product QualityThe Journal of Law and Economics, 24
Abstract. This paper presents the results of 16 laboratory markets designed to test the theoretical assertion that, when disclosures are credible, managers/sellers will fully disclose private information to potential investors/buyers. Sellers are predicted to disclose all information so as not to be classified as having the worst possible information. This experiment manipulated two treatments: the number of disclosure options available to the seller and the buyers' knowledge of those disclosure options. The results show that, after repeated dealings between sellers and buyers, the sellers moved toward full disclosure. Buyers adjusted their bidding strategies in response to the seller's disclosure strategy in all markets except those that had both (1) a large number of disclosure options and (2) no knowledge by buyers of the disclosure options. These results may provide some perspective on the market‐based results that show that investors do not react in a fully skeptical fashion with respect to managerial disclosures. Our results suggest that knowledge of the menu of disclosure options may increase the speed of markets adjusting to disclosures, particularly when the menu of disclosure options is large. Résumé. Les auteurs présentent les résultats de l'étude en laboratoire de seize marchés à partir desquels ils ont voulu vérifier l'affirmation théorique selon laquelle, lorsque l'information communiquée est vraisemblable, les gestionnaires‐vendeurs présentent intégralement l'information privilégiée aux investissieurs‐acheteurs potentiels. La décision des vendeurs de communiquer intégralement l'information serait motivée par leur désir de ne pas laisser supposer que l'information qu'ils possèdent est extrêmement négative. Dans le cadre de cette expérience, les auteurs ont abordé la question sous deux angles: le nombre d'options dont dispose le vendeur en matière de présentation de l'information et la connaissance de ces différentes options chez l'acheteur. Les résultats démontrent qu'après plusieurs séances de négociation entre vendeurs et acheteurs, les vendeurs consentaient à la présentation intégrale de l'information. Les acheteurs adaptaient leur stratégie d'offre en réponse à la stratégie de présentation de l'information du vendeur dans tous les marchés, à l'exception des marchés caractérisés à la fois par 1) un nombre important d'options de présentation de l'information et 2) aucune connaissance, chez les acheteurs, des options de présentation de l'information. Ces résultats pourraient ouvrir certaines perspectives en ce qui a trait aux résultats, fondés sur le marché, qui démontrent que les investisseurs ne mettent pas systématiquement en doute l'information présentée par les gestionnaires. Les résultats de l'étude laissent supposer que la connaissance des différentes options de présentation de l'information peut accélérer l'adaptation des marchés à la présentation de l'information, en particulier lorsque les options de présentation sont nombreuses.
Contemporary Accounting Research – Wiley
Published: Sep 1, 1991
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.