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UNIVERSAL BANKS ARE NOT THE ANSWER TO AMERICA'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE “PROBLEM”: A LOOK AT GERMANY, JAPAN, AND THE U.S.

UNIVERSAL BANKS ARE NOT THE ANSWER TO AMERICA'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE “PROBLEM”: A LOOK AT... This article objects to a recent tendency of legal and economic scholars to “romanticize” the corporate governance role of German universal banks and Japanese main banks. There are potential conflicts between banks' interests as lenders and as shareholders that are likely to make banks less‐than‐ideal monitors for outside shareholders. Citing evidence that Japanese corporate borrowers pay above‐market interest rates for their bank financing, Macey and Miller interpret the high interest rates as “rents” earned by Japanese banks on their loan portfolios in exchange for (1) insulating incumbent management of borrower firms from hostile takeover and (2) accepting suboptimal returns on their equity holdings. The main problems with the German and Japanese systems stem from their failure to produce well‐developed capital markets. Concentrated and stable shareholdings reduce the order flow in the market, thereby depriving the market of liquidity. And the lack of capital market liquidity– combined with the intense loyalty of the banks towards incumbent management–removes the ability of outside shareholders to make a credible threat of takeover if managerial performance is substandard. The problem with American corporate governance–if indeed there is one–is not that hostile takeovers are bad, but that there are not enough of them due to regulatory restrictions and misguided legal policies. While U.S. law should be amended to give banks and other debtholders more power over borrowers in the case of financial distress, encouraging U.S. banks to become large stockholders is not likely to improve corporate efficiency. Strengthening the “voice” of American equity holders by eliminating restrictions on the market for corporate control would be the most effective step in improving firm performance. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Applied Corporate Finance Wiley

UNIVERSAL BANKS ARE NOT THE ANSWER TO AMERICA'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE “PROBLEM”: A LOOK AT GERMANY, JAPAN, AND THE U.S.

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References (9)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 1997 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
1078-1196
eISSN
1745-6622
DOI
10.1111/j.1745-6622.1997.tb00624.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This article objects to a recent tendency of legal and economic scholars to “romanticize” the corporate governance role of German universal banks and Japanese main banks. There are potential conflicts between banks' interests as lenders and as shareholders that are likely to make banks less‐than‐ideal monitors for outside shareholders. Citing evidence that Japanese corporate borrowers pay above‐market interest rates for their bank financing, Macey and Miller interpret the high interest rates as “rents” earned by Japanese banks on their loan portfolios in exchange for (1) insulating incumbent management of borrower firms from hostile takeover and (2) accepting suboptimal returns on their equity holdings. The main problems with the German and Japanese systems stem from their failure to produce well‐developed capital markets. Concentrated and stable shareholdings reduce the order flow in the market, thereby depriving the market of liquidity. And the lack of capital market liquidity– combined with the intense loyalty of the banks towards incumbent management–removes the ability of outside shareholders to make a credible threat of takeover if managerial performance is substandard. The problem with American corporate governance–if indeed there is one–is not that hostile takeovers are bad, but that there are not enough of them due to regulatory restrictions and misguided legal policies. While U.S. law should be amended to give banks and other debtholders more power over borrowers in the case of financial distress, encouraging U.S. banks to become large stockholders is not likely to improve corporate efficiency. Strengthening the “voice” of American equity holders by eliminating restrictions on the market for corporate control would be the most effective step in improving firm performance.

Journal

Journal of Applied Corporate Finance – Wiley

Published: Jan 1, 1997

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