The draft provisions on antitrust fines in the Commission’s ECN+ Proposal

The draft provisions on antitrust fines in the Commission’s ECN+ Proposal AbstractOn 22 March 2017, the Commission released its Proposal for a directive to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers (COM(2017) 142 final). With this effort to harmonise national public enforcement regimes, the Commission enters uncharted territory. Effectiveness is deemed to be fostered by the introduction of the economic entity doctrine as a unitary sanctioning concept throughout the Member States. As a complementing measure, the Proposal prescribes a more coherent standard for leniency in the European Competition Network. The present article ventures to evaluate these remedies. A preliminary hypothesis is that the Commission’s conviction of the economic entity doctrine to become the gold standard for antitrust enforcement is possibly based on tenuous ideas of effectiveness. Moreover, the introduction of a 10 % fine cap for any National Competition Authority irrespective of the size of the Member State can lead to highly disparate relative fining powers throughout the internal market. As to the leniency aspect, the present article will attempt to assess whether the Proposal taps the full potential for enhancement. As an alternative to the Commission’s suggestions the article elaborates on a one-stop-shop leniency principle. Such would go beyond the current Proposal in that it would render multiple leniency filings obsolete within the EU. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht de Gruyter

The draft provisions on antitrust fines in the Commission’s ECN+ Proposal

Loading next page...
 
/lp/degruyter/the-draft-provisions-on-antitrust-fines-in-the-commission-s-ecn-r8x3htVvY9
Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
© 2018 RWS Verlag Kommunikationsforum GmbH, Aachener Str. 222, 50931 Köln.
ISSN
1611-1982
eISSN
2199-1723
D.O.I.
10.15375/zwer-2018-0103
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractOn 22 March 2017, the Commission released its Proposal for a directive to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers (COM(2017) 142 final). With this effort to harmonise national public enforcement regimes, the Commission enters uncharted territory. Effectiveness is deemed to be fostered by the introduction of the economic entity doctrine as a unitary sanctioning concept throughout the Member States. As a complementing measure, the Proposal prescribes a more coherent standard for leniency in the European Competition Network. The present article ventures to evaluate these remedies. A preliminary hypothesis is that the Commission’s conviction of the economic entity doctrine to become the gold standard for antitrust enforcement is possibly based on tenuous ideas of effectiveness. Moreover, the introduction of a 10 % fine cap for any National Competition Authority irrespective of the size of the Member State can lead to highly disparate relative fining powers throughout the internal market. As to the leniency aspect, the present article will attempt to assess whether the Proposal taps the full potential for enhancement. As an alternative to the Commission’s suggestions the article elaborates on a one-stop-shop leniency principle. Such would go beyond the current Proposal in that it would render multiple leniency filings obsolete within the EU.

Journal

Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrechtde Gruyter

Published: Mar 2, 2018

There are no references for this article.

You’re reading a free preview. Subscribe to read the entire article.


DeepDyve is your
personal research library

It’s your single place to instantly
discover and read the research
that matters to you.

Enjoy affordable access to
over 18 million articles from more than
15,000 peer-reviewed journals.

All for just $49/month

Explore the DeepDyve Library

Search

Query the DeepDyve database, plus search all of PubMed and Google Scholar seamlessly

Organize

Save any article or search result from DeepDyve, PubMed, and Google Scholar... all in one place.

Access

Get unlimited, online access to over 18 million full-text articles from more than 15,000 scientific journals.

Your journals are on DeepDyve

Read from thousands of the leading scholarly journals from SpringerNature, Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford University Press and more.

All the latest content is available, no embargo periods.

See the journals in your area

DeepDyve

Freelancer

DeepDyve

Pro

Price

FREE

$49/month
$360/year

Save searches from
Google Scholar,
PubMed

Create lists to
organize your research

Export lists, citations

Read DeepDyve articles

Abstract access only

Unlimited access to over
18 million full-text articles

Print

20 pages / month

PDF Discount

20% off