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How to Win the Brussels Game? Explaining the European Parliament’s Success under the Co-Decision

How to Win the Brussels Game? Explaining the European Parliament’s Success under the Co-Decision Abstract:The purpose of the article is to identify the conditions that affect the success of the European Parliament’s amendments in the ordinary legislative procedure. In the first step, hypotheses were delineated predicting the impact of specific factors on the effectiveness of EP demands. Subsequently, they were verified using the logistic regression. The results revealed that the EP is more likely to be successful in this procedure if it applies the following negotiation techniques. First, it bundles several legislative proposals in one package. Second, it persuades the European Commission to support its amendments. Third, it negotiates the legislative proposals in trilogues. Fourth, it is cohesive during negotiations. Fifth, it prolongs negotiations with the Council until the end of parliamentary term. Sixth, it designates a rapporteur from a country acting at the same time as the Council Presidency. Seventh, it negotiates with the Council when the Presidency legislative workload is high. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png World Political Science de Gruyter

How to Win the Brussels Game? Explaining the European Parliament’s Success under the Co-Decision

World Political Science , Volume 14 (1): 22 – Apr 25, 2018

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References (41)

Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
©2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
ISSN
2363-4774
eISSN
2363-4782
DOI
10.1515/wps-2018-0005
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract:The purpose of the article is to identify the conditions that affect the success of the European Parliament’s amendments in the ordinary legislative procedure. In the first step, hypotheses were delineated predicting the impact of specific factors on the effectiveness of EP demands. Subsequently, they were verified using the logistic regression. The results revealed that the EP is more likely to be successful in this procedure if it applies the following negotiation techniques. First, it bundles several legislative proposals in one package. Second, it persuades the European Commission to support its amendments. Third, it negotiates the legislative proposals in trilogues. Fourth, it is cohesive during negotiations. Fifth, it prolongs negotiations with the Council until the end of parliamentary term. Sixth, it designates a rapporteur from a country acting at the same time as the Council Presidency. Seventh, it negotiates with the Council when the Presidency legislative workload is high.

Journal

World Political Sciencede Gruyter

Published: Apr 25, 2018

There are no references for this article.