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No-leak authentication by the Sherlock Holmes method

No-leak authentication by the Sherlock Holmes method Abstract. We propose a class of authentication schemes that are literally zero-knowledge, as compared to what is formally defined as “zero-knowledge” in cryptographic literature. We call this “no-leak” authentication to distinguish from an established “zero-knowledge” concept. The “no-leak” condition implies “zero-knowledge” (even “perfect zero-knowledge”), but it is actually stronger, as we illustrate by examples. The principal idea behind our schemes is: the verifier challenges the prover with questions that he (the verifier) already knows answers to; therefore, even a computationally unbounded verifier who follows the protocol cannot possibly learn anything new during any number of authentication sessions. This is therefore also true for a computationally unbounded passive adversary. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Groups - Complexity - Cryptology de Gruyter

No-leak authentication by the Sherlock Holmes method

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Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 by the
ISSN
1867-1144
eISSN
1869-6104
DOI
10.1515/gcc-2012-0009
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract. We propose a class of authentication schemes that are literally zero-knowledge, as compared to what is formally defined as “zero-knowledge” in cryptographic literature. We call this “no-leak” authentication to distinguish from an established “zero-knowledge” concept. The “no-leak” condition implies “zero-knowledge” (even “perfect zero-knowledge”), but it is actually stronger, as we illustrate by examples. The principal idea behind our schemes is: the verifier challenges the prover with questions that he (the verifier) already knows answers to; therefore, even a computationally unbounded verifier who follows the protocol cannot possibly learn anything new during any number of authentication sessions. This is therefore also true for a computationally unbounded passive adversary.

Journal

Groups - Complexity - Cryptology – de Gruyter

Published: May 1, 2012

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