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by Laudilan Chipman, Melbourne In most editions of Kant's Crltique of Pure Reason the section entitled "The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding" takes no more than eight pages. It is beyond dispute that Kant regarded this short section äs constituting an essential part of the proof that pure concepts of understanding or categories play a necessary role in the production of any experience we can conceive ourselves äs having. Whether Kant was right to so regard it has been disputed. I shall argue that he was. In the first part of the paper I shall offer an exposition of the Transcendental Deduction, in an attempt to show that a number of questions which arise out of it, and which Kant was entitled to regard äs important, are left unanswered at the conclusion of the Analytic of Concepts. The Schematism is intended to answer one such question. In the second part I shall set out and examine what I take to be the primary doctrines of the Schematism section, and shall argue that although far from defensible in every respect, the Schematism at least has the merit of being a largely coherent treatment of a problem which
Kant-Studien – de Gruyter
Published: Jan 1, 1972
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