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Justifying Fair Price Rules in Contract Law

Justifying Fair Price Rules in Contract Law This article discusses the introduction of a general `fair price rule' in (European) contract law. According to such a rule, prices that create a `significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations' would not bind the disadvantaged party. Justifying this rule cannot be avoided by holding, as Martijn Hesselink does, that in light of a `reasonable pluralism of worldviews', the issue is one which a democratically elected lawmaker has to decide. A welfarist (economic) conception of justice best explains the existing (European) rules on contract formation and price, and it also casts a long and dark shadow over a general `fair price rule'. Résumé: Cet article porte sur l'introduction d'un principe général du juste prix dans le droit (européen) des contrats. Selon un tel principe, un prix qui serait source d'un déséquilibre significatif entre les droits et obligations des parties n'obligerait pas la partie faible. On ne peut se dispenser de le justifier en disant, comme le fait Martin Hesselink, qu'au regard d'un pluralisme raisonnable de visions du monde, il appartient au législateur démocratiquement élu de décider. Une conception (économique) de justice-providence constitue la meilleure explication des règles (européennes) existantes relatives à la formation du contrat et du http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png European Review of Contract Law de Gruyter

Justifying Fair Price Rules in Contract Law

European Review of Contract Law , Volume 11 (3) – Oct 1, 2015

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Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by the
ISSN
1614-9920
eISSN
1614-9939
DOI
10.1515/ercl-2015-0014
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This article discusses the introduction of a general `fair price rule' in (European) contract law. According to such a rule, prices that create a `significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations' would not bind the disadvantaged party. Justifying this rule cannot be avoided by holding, as Martijn Hesselink does, that in light of a `reasonable pluralism of worldviews', the issue is one which a democratically elected lawmaker has to decide. A welfarist (economic) conception of justice best explains the existing (European) rules on contract formation and price, and it also casts a long and dark shadow over a general `fair price rule'. Résumé: Cet article porte sur l'introduction d'un principe général du juste prix dans le droit (européen) des contrats. Selon un tel principe, un prix qui serait source d'un déséquilibre significatif entre les droits et obligations des parties n'obligerait pas la partie faible. On ne peut se dispenser de le justifier en disant, comme le fait Martin Hesselink, qu'au regard d'un pluralisme raisonnable de visions du monde, il appartient au législateur démocratiquement élu de décider. Une conception (économique) de justice-providence constitue la meilleure explication des règles (européennes) existantes relatives à la formation du contrat et du

Journal

European Review of Contract Lawde Gruyter

Published: Oct 1, 2015

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