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AbstractUsing Kosovo and its constitutional jurisprudence as a case study, this paper discusses the role of constitutional courts as agents for implementing a democratic project on behalf of the sovereign as the principal. It discusses that role primarily from the point of view of the court’s functional intervention in improving the behaviour of the three branches of government. The paper begins by unveiling the historical development of constitutional justice, with as its focus the concept of new constitutionalism and the European/Kelsenian model encountered in Kosovo. It discusses too the theories of delegation of power, the contractual relationship, and trust between sovereigns and constitutional adjudicators in the context of subjects connected with this article. To present scenarios where the court manifests itself as a negative legislator, a positive legislator, and as an influencer of attitudes, the article includes convincing illustrations from both legal theory and case-law.
Südosteuropa – de Gruyter
Published: Dec 16, 2020
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