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HYPOTHESIS AND EXPLANATION IN KANT’S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

HYPOTHESIS AND EXPLANATION IN KANT’S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE HYPOTHESIS AND EXPLANATION IN KANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE* by ROBERT E. BUTTS I. Introduction Kant's Substantive contributions to the epistemology of science-- bis analysis of categories in terms of rules, bis recognition of the inadequacy of empirical attempts at a justification of induction, to name only two -- are fairly well recognized today; and the frequency with which bis views are cited (both correctly and incorrectly) bears sufficient testimony to the lasting value of bis work in the philosophy of science. However, certain aspects of Kant's philosophy of science are not so well known nor their importance recognized. For example, the formal considerations on methodology contained in the "Transcendental Doctrine of Method" in the Critique of Pure Reason are, except for the celebrated distinction drawn between philosophy and mathematics, largely unexplored. Perhaps this is in part because Kant's major commentators have found the task of getting beyond the "Analytic" of the first Critique too great and also in part because the formal analysis of methodological problems has so rapidly gone beyond the Kantian historical frame of reference. Nevertheless, to ignore Part H of the first Critique is to miss some of Kant's finest philosophic moments. It has always http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie de Gruyter

HYPOTHESIS AND EXPLANATION IN KANT’S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

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References (1)

Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
Copyright © 2009 Walter de Gruyter
ISSN
0003-9101
eISSN
1613-0650
DOI
10.1515/agph.1961.43.2.153
Publisher site
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Abstract

HYPOTHESIS AND EXPLANATION IN KANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE* by ROBERT E. BUTTS I. Introduction Kant's Substantive contributions to the epistemology of science-- bis analysis of categories in terms of rules, bis recognition of the inadequacy of empirical attempts at a justification of induction, to name only two -- are fairly well recognized today; and the frequency with which bis views are cited (both correctly and incorrectly) bears sufficient testimony to the lasting value of bis work in the philosophy of science. However, certain aspects of Kant's philosophy of science are not so well known nor their importance recognized. For example, the formal considerations on methodology contained in the "Transcendental Doctrine of Method" in the Critique of Pure Reason are, except for the celebrated distinction drawn between philosophy and mathematics, largely unexplored. Perhaps this is in part because Kant's major commentators have found the task of getting beyond the "Analytic" of the first Critique too great and also in part because the formal analysis of methodological problems has so rapidly gone beyond the Kantian historical frame of reference. Nevertheless, to ignore Part H of the first Critique is to miss some of Kant's finest philosophic moments. It has always

Journal

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie – de Gruyter

Published: Jan 1, 1961

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