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Guard Sets in Tor using AS Relationships

Guard Sets in Tor using AS Relationships AbstractThe mechanism for picking guards in Tor suffers from security problems like guard fingerprinting and from performance issues. To address these issues, Hayes and Danezis proposed the use of guard sets, in which the Tor system groups all guards into sets, and each client picks one of these sets and uses its guards. Unfortunately, guard sets frequently need nodes added or they are broken up due to fluctuations in network bandwidth. In this paper, we first show that these breakups create opportunities for malicious guards to join many guard sets by merely tuning the bandwidth they make available to Tor, and this greatly increases the number of clients exposed to malicious guards. To address this problem, we propose a new method for forming guard sets based on Internet location. We construct a hierarchy that keeps clients and guards together more reliably and prevents guards from easily joining arbitrary guard sets. This approach also has the advantage of confining an attacker with access to limited locations on the Internet to a small number of guard sets. We simulate this guard set design using historical Tor data in the presence of both relay-level adversaries and networklevel adversaries, and we find that our approach is good at confining the adversary into few guard sets, thus limiting the impact of attacks. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies de Gruyter

Guard Sets in Tor using AS Relationships

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Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
© 2018 Mohsen Imani et al., published by De Gruyter Open
ISSN
2299-0984
eISSN
2299-0984
DOI
10.1515/popets-2018-0008
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractThe mechanism for picking guards in Tor suffers from security problems like guard fingerprinting and from performance issues. To address these issues, Hayes and Danezis proposed the use of guard sets, in which the Tor system groups all guards into sets, and each client picks one of these sets and uses its guards. Unfortunately, guard sets frequently need nodes added or they are broken up due to fluctuations in network bandwidth. In this paper, we first show that these breakups create opportunities for malicious guards to join many guard sets by merely tuning the bandwidth they make available to Tor, and this greatly increases the number of clients exposed to malicious guards. To address this problem, we propose a new method for forming guard sets based on Internet location. We construct a hierarchy that keeps clients and guards together more reliably and prevents guards from easily joining arbitrary guard sets. This approach also has the advantage of confining an attacker with access to limited locations on the Internet to a small number of guard sets. We simulate this guard set design using historical Tor data in the presence of both relay-level adversaries and networklevel adversaries, and we find that our approach is good at confining the adversary into few guard sets, thus limiting the impact of attacks.

Journal

Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies – de Gruyter

Published: Jan 1, 2018

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