A Sketch of (an Actually Serious) Meinongian Presentism

A Sketch of (an Actually Serious) Meinongian Presentism Abstract In this paper I shall “draw” a sketch of a version of Meinongian Presentism. After having briefly presented some data that presentists need to explain and three problems that typically affect presentism (the triviality objection, the problem of the reference of true propositions’ constituents that seem to involve merely past and merely future objects, the truthmaking problem), I shall clarify the bases of my theory. First, I shall reject the actualist presentist assumption, according to which there are no things that do not exist now. Secondly, I shall introduce some notions (e.g., the ones of tensed properties and of temporal existence) that will be useful in order to clarify the contrast between eternalist and non-eternalist metaphysical theories of time. Thirdly, I shall define Meinongian Presentism. Finally, I shall try to demonstrate that this version can deal with the aforementioned problems and with the presentist data in a serious and perspicuous way. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Metaphysica de Gruyter

A Sketch of (an Actually Serious) Meinongian Presentism

Metaphysica, Volume 17 (1) – Apr 1, 2016

A Sketch of (an Actually Serious) Meinongian Presentism


In this paper I shall "draw" a sketch of a version of Meinongian Presentism. After having briefly presented some data that presentists need to explain and three problems that typically affect presentism (the triviality objection, the problem of the reference of true propositions' constituents that seem to involve merely past and merely future objects, the truthmaking problem), I shall clarify the bases of my theory. First, I shall reject the actualist presentist assumption, according to which there are no things that do not exist now. Secondly, I shall introduce some notions (e.g., the ones of tensed properties and of temporal existence) that will be useful in order to clarify the contrast between eternalist and non-eternalist metaphysical theories of time. Thirdly, I shall define Meinongian Presentism. Finally, I shall try to demonstrate that this version can deal with the aforementioned problems and with the presentist data in a serious and perspicuous way. Keywords: Meinongianism, metaphysics, presentism, time, triviality objection I shall present in this article an original Meinongian version of presentism, according to which there is nothing that is not present (this is the presentist aspect of the theory), even if there are now things that do not now exist and, more generally, there are now things that do not exist (this is the Meinongian aspect). I shall try to demonstrate that this theory is a viable and serious option for presentists who aim at dealing with three problems typically connected with presentism: the triviality objection; the problem of the reference of true propositions' constituents that seem to involve merely past and merely future objects; the truthmaking problem. One of the major advantages of presentist theories in metaphysics of time consists in their being able to give reason to substantial change, i.e., to things' absolutely coming and ceasing to exist (see, for example, Markosian (2004)). A preliminary...
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Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 by the
ISSN
1437-2053
eISSN
1874-6373
DOI
10.1515/mp-2015-0017
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract In this paper I shall “draw” a sketch of a version of Meinongian Presentism. After having briefly presented some data that presentists need to explain and three problems that typically affect presentism (the triviality objection, the problem of the reference of true propositions’ constituents that seem to involve merely past and merely future objects, the truthmaking problem), I shall clarify the bases of my theory. First, I shall reject the actualist presentist assumption, according to which there are no things that do not exist now. Secondly, I shall introduce some notions (e.g., the ones of tensed properties and of temporal existence) that will be useful in order to clarify the contrast between eternalist and non-eternalist metaphysical theories of time. Thirdly, I shall define Meinongian Presentism. Finally, I shall try to demonstrate that this version can deal with the aforementioned problems and with the presentist data in a serious and perspicuous way.

Journal

Metaphysicade Gruyter

Published: Apr 1, 2016

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