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Do federal davis-bacon and disadvantaged business enterprise regulations affect aggressive bidding? evidence from highway resurfacing procurement auctions

Do federal davis-bacon and disadvantaged business enterprise regulations affect aggressive... <jats:p>Previous empirical studies examine the effect of asymmetries across bidders on auction outcomes. This paper tests for asymmetries in behavior when bidders are confronted with different regulatory environments. Data from federal and state highway resurfacing projects in Colorado are used to determine if bids are more aggressive when contractors switch from federal projects, with Davis-Bacon prevailing wage and Disadvantaged Business Enterprise regulations, to less-regulated state projects. Results from fixed effects estimates of winning bids indicate that the level of aggressive bidding is not altered with a change in regulations, at least not with respect to the policies and types of projects examined here.</jats:p> http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Public Procurement CrossRef

Do federal davis-bacon and disadvantaged business enterprise regulations affect aggressive bidding? evidence from highway resurfacing procurement auctions

Journal of Public Procurement , Volume 15 (3): 291-316 – Mar 1, 2015

Do federal davis-bacon and disadvantaged business enterprise regulations affect aggressive bidding? evidence from highway resurfacing procurement auctions


Abstract

<jats:p>Previous empirical studies examine the effect of asymmetries across bidders on auction outcomes. This paper tests for asymmetries in behavior when bidders are confronted with different regulatory environments. Data from federal and state highway resurfacing projects in Colorado are used to determine if bids are more aggressive when contractors switch from federal projects, with Davis-Bacon prevailing wage and Disadvantaged Business Enterprise regulations, to less-regulated state projects. Results from fixed effects estimates of winning bids indicate that the level of aggressive bidding is not altered with a change in regulations, at least not with respect to the policies and types of projects examined here.</jats:p>

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Publisher
CrossRef
ISSN
1535-0118
DOI
10.1108/jopp-15-03-2015-b002
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

<jats:p>Previous empirical studies examine the effect of asymmetries across bidders on auction outcomes. This paper tests for asymmetries in behavior when bidders are confronted with different regulatory environments. Data from federal and state highway resurfacing projects in Colorado are used to determine if bids are more aggressive when contractors switch from federal projects, with Davis-Bacon prevailing wage and Disadvantaged Business Enterprise regulations, to less-regulated state projects. Results from fixed effects estimates of winning bids indicate that the level of aggressive bidding is not altered with a change in regulations, at least not with respect to the policies and types of projects examined here.</jats:p>

Journal

Journal of Public ProcurementCrossRef

Published: Mar 1, 2015

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