Abstract

<jats:p>When, if ever, may a court award damages to a plaintiff whose case sounds only in equity, not in law? In <jats:italic>Hooper</jats:italic> v. <jats:italic>Rogers</jats:italic> an award of damages in respect of a nuisance which had not yet resulted in any relevant damage was upheld by the Court of Appeal. In <jats:italic>Wrotham Park Estate Co. Ltd.</jats:italic> v. <jats:italic>Parkside Homes Ltd.</jats:italic> Brightman J. awarded substantial damages for breach of a restrictive covenant to the successors in title of the covenantee against the successors in title of the covenantor. In <jats:italic>Wroth</jats:italic> v. <jats:italic>Tyler</jats:italic> damages for the non-performance of a contract for the sale of a house were assessed by reference to the value of the house at the date of the hearing, not the date of breach. In none of these cases could the decisions have been justified on common law principles alone and all are in fact founded upon the Chancery Amendment Act 1858, commonly known as Lord Cairns' Act. Yet in <jats:italic>Redland Bricks Ltd.</jats:italic> v. <jats:italic>Morris</jats:italic>, while the Court of Appeal considered that an elaborate discussion of that Act was necessary and, indeed, differed in opinion as to the result of its application to the circumstances of the case, the House of Lords, through Lord Upjohn, dismissed the matter briefly and categorically with the observation that Lord Cairns' Act had nothing whatever to do with the principles of law applicable to the case. The time seems ripe for an examination of the meaning and present status of the Act.</jats:p>