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A dilemma for reasons additivity

A dilemma for reasons additivity Abstract This paper presents a dilemma for the additive model of reasons. Either the model accommodates disjunctive cases in which one ought to perform some act $$\phi $$ just in case at least one of two factors obtains, or it accommodates conjunctive cases in which one ought to $$\phi $$ just in case both of two factors obtains. The dilemma also arises in a revised additive model that accommodates imprecisely weighted reasons. There exist disjunctive and conjunctive cases. Hence the additive model is extensionally inadequate. The upshot of the dilemma is that one of the most influential accounts of how reasons accrue to determine what we ought to do is flawed. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Economics and Philosophy Cambridge University Press

A dilemma for reasons additivity

Keeling, Geoff
Economics and Philosophy , Volume 39 (1): 23 – Mar 1, 2023
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Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press
ISSN
1474-0028
eISSN
0266-2671
DOI
10.1017/S026626712100033X
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract This paper presents a dilemma for the additive model of reasons. Either the model accommodates disjunctive cases in which one ought to perform some act $$\phi $$ just in case at least one of two factors obtains, or it accommodates conjunctive cases in which one ought to $$\phi $$ just in case both of two factors obtains. The dilemma also arises in a revised additive model that accommodates imprecisely weighted reasons. There exist disjunctive and conjunctive cases. Hence the additive model is extensionally inadequate. The upshot of the dilemma is that one of the most influential accounts of how reasons accrue to determine what we ought to do is flawed.

Journal

Economics and Philosophy – Cambridge University Press

Published: Mar 1, 2023

Keywords: Reasons; weighing; aggregation; additive; normativity

References

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    Berker, S.
  • Parity, interval value, and choice
    Chang, R.
  • A reason-based theory of rational choice
    Dietrich, F.; List, C.
  • Moral pluralism
    Gaut, B.
  • Accidentally doing the right thing
    Johnson King, Z.
  • The additive fallacy
    Kagan, S.
  • An unconnected heap of duties?
    McNaughton, D.
  • Comparative value and the weight of reasons
    Sher, I.
  • Reasons for and reasons against
    Snedegar, J.
  • Reasons without reasons for
    Titelbaum, M.