Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
F. Cushman, L. Young, M. Hauser (2006)
The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral JudgmentPsychological Science, 17
J. Rachels (1975)
Active and passive euthanasia.The New England journal of medicine, 292 2
T. Connolly, J. Reb (2003)
Omission bias in vaccination decisions: Where’s the “omission”? Where’s the “bias”?Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 91
F. Cushman (2008)
Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgmentCognition, 108
Opinion TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.11 No.4 Universal moral grammar: theory, evidence and the future
M. Alicke (2000)
Culpable control and the psychology of blame.Psychological bulletin, 126 4
Carmen Tanner, D. Medin (2004)
Protected values: No omission bias and no framing effectsPsychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11
R. Young (2007)
Medically Assisted Death: Contents
A. Patt, R. Zeckhauser (2000)
Action Bias and Environmental DecisionsJournal of Risk and Uncertainty, 21
Michael Waldmann, Jörn Dieterich (2007)
Throwing a Bomb on a Person Versus Throwing a Person on a BombPsychological Science, 18
Ilana Ritov, J. Baron (1990)
Behavioral Law and Economics: Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission Bias and Ambiguity
<jats:sec><jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Legal scholars and philosophers have long debated the moral standing of the act-omission distinction, with some favoring the view that actions ought to be considered as morally different from omissions, while others disagree. Several empirical studies suggest that people judge actions that cause harm as worse than omissions that cause the same harm with the implication that our folk psychology commonly perceives this distinction as morally significant. Here we explore the robustness of people's moral intuitions, and in particular, whether the omission bias can be eliminated in the face of explicit and familiar laws that take away the moral standing of the distinction between actions and omissions. We show that although Dutch law allows both active and passive euthanasia, and although our Dutch participants were well aware of this law and supported it, they nonetheless showed a robust omission bias across a wide range of moral dilemmas. We conclude by discussing the relationship between our folk moral intuitions and explicit moral rules that are handed down by law and religion.</jats:p> </jats:sec>
Journal of Cognition and Culture – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 2009
Keywords: EUTHANASIA; LAW; COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY; UNIVERSALITY; MORAL INTUITIONS; OMISSION BIAS
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.