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“Until the End of the World”: Eidetic Variation and Absolute Being of Consciousness—A Reconsideration

“Until the End of the World”: Eidetic Variation and Absolute Being of Consciousness—A... This paper suggests interpreting Husserl’s thesis of the “fictional destruction of the world” ( gedankliche Destruktion der Welt ) in the light of the eidetic method of variation. After having reconstructed Husserl’s argument and shown how it relies on the methodologically regimented joint venture of free fantasy and bounded concepts, the author concludes that (1) the a priori of a world, namely its empirical (more or less rational) style, is tantamount to the a priori of a world that can be possibly experienced by some conceivable form of consciousness. (2) If consciousness is a priori bound to transcendence, such transcendence is not necessarily supposed to be the transcendence of a world, for a non-world would be enough to entertain the intentional directedness. This twofold claim allows for a novel interpretation of Husserl’s principle of the asymmetry between world and consciousness. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Research in Phenomenology Brill

“Until the End of the World”: Eidetic Variation and Absolute Being of Consciousness—A Reconsideration

Research in Phenomenology , Volume 46 (2): 157 – May 28, 2016

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
Subject
Topic: The New Husserl
ISSN
0085-5553
eISSN
1569-1640
DOI
10.1163/15691640-12341334
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper suggests interpreting Husserl’s thesis of the “fictional destruction of the world” ( gedankliche Destruktion der Welt ) in the light of the eidetic method of variation. After having reconstructed Husserl’s argument and shown how it relies on the methodologically regimented joint venture of free fantasy and bounded concepts, the author concludes that (1) the a priori of a world, namely its empirical (more or less rational) style, is tantamount to the a priori of a world that can be possibly experienced by some conceivable form of consciousness. (2) If consciousness is a priori bound to transcendence, such transcendence is not necessarily supposed to be the transcendence of a world, for a non-world would be enough to entertain the intentional directedness. This twofold claim allows for a novel interpretation of Husserl’s principle of the asymmetry between world and consciousness.

Journal

Research in PhenomenologyBrill

Published: May 28, 2016

Keywords: Husserl; world; consciousness; non-world; variation; destruction

References