Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Two Kinds of Soft Facts

Two Kinds of Soft Facts The concept of soft facts is crucial for the Ockhamistic analysis of the divine knowledge of future contingents; moreover, this notion is important in itself because it concerns the structure of the facts that depend—in some sense—on other future facts. However, the debate on soft facts is often flawed by the unaware use of two different notions of soft facts. The facts of the first kind are supervenient on temporal facts: By bringing about a temporal fact, the agent can bring about these facts. However, on the one hand, the determination of the existence of these facts does not affect the past; on the other hand, assimilating divine knowledge into this kind of facts does not help the Ockhamist. The authors will argue that, to vindicate Ockhamism, another definition of “soft fact” is necessary, which turns out to be much more demanding from a metaphysical point of view. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Grazer Philosophische Studien Brill

Two Kinds of Soft Facts

De Florio, Ciro; Frigerio, Aldo
Grazer Philosophische Studien , Volume 95 (1): 20 – Feb 22, 2018
Download PDF
20 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/brill/two-kinds-of-soft-facts-BHd0a1Bnr9

References

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0165-9227
eISSN
1875-6735
DOI
10.1163/18756735-000031
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The concept of soft facts is crucial for the Ockhamistic analysis of the divine knowledge of future contingents; moreover, this notion is important in itself because it concerns the structure of the facts that depend—in some sense—on other future facts. However, the debate on soft facts is often flawed by the unaware use of two different notions of soft facts. The facts of the first kind are supervenient on temporal facts: By bringing about a temporal fact, the agent can bring about these facts. However, on the one hand, the determination of the existence of these facts does not affect the past; on the other hand, assimilating divine knowledge into this kind of facts does not help the Ockhamist. The authors will argue that, to vindicate Ockhamism, another definition of “soft fact” is necessary, which turns out to be much more demanding from a metaphysical point of view.

Journal

Grazer Philosophische Studien – Brill

Published: Feb 22, 2018

References

  • Metaphysical Grounding