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The Transformation of the Sense of Dasein in Heidegger's Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)

The Transformation of the Sense of Dasein in Heidegger's Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SENSE OF DASEIN IN HEIDEGGER’S BEITRÄGE ZUR PHILOSOPHIE (VOM EREIGNIS) by MIGUEL DE BEISTEGUI University of Warwick I want to start with the very beginning, with the word “being,” in order to justify, at least in a preliminary way, its further qualiŽ cation as Ereignis . I want to begin by raising the question regarding the kind of proposition, and this means the kind of question, which is suited to the matter. At the heart of being lies the following contradiction, which repre- sentational thought—metaphysics—has continuously and consistently overlooked: being “is” not; it is, literally, nothing . For “is” or “are” only those things—those beings—that can be represented, only those beings with a minimal structure of identity and permanence such that they can be identiŽ ed and recognized by way of nouns, or substantives. In one way or another, beings are substances, or derived from substances, or attached and attributed to substances. Yet because “being” is not a thing, because it is no-thing, it is the one and most singular excep- tion to the rule and law, as well as to the logic of substance, a rule and a logic that has come to http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Research in Phenomenology Brill

The Transformation of the Sense of Dasein in Heidegger's Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)

Research in Phenomenology , Volume 33 (1): 221 – Jan 1, 2003

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 2003 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0085-5553
eISSN
1569-1640
DOI
10.1163/15691640360699681
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SENSE OF DASEIN IN HEIDEGGER’S BEITRÄGE ZUR PHILOSOPHIE (VOM EREIGNIS) by MIGUEL DE BEISTEGUI University of Warwick I want to start with the very beginning, with the word “being,” in order to justify, at least in a preliminary way, its further qualiŽ cation as Ereignis . I want to begin by raising the question regarding the kind of proposition, and this means the kind of question, which is suited to the matter. At the heart of being lies the following contradiction, which repre- sentational thought—metaphysics—has continuously and consistently overlooked: being “is” not; it is, literally, nothing . For “is” or “are” only those things—those beings—that can be represented, only those beings with a minimal structure of identity and permanence such that they can be identiŽ ed and recognized by way of nouns, or substantives. In one way or another, beings are substances, or derived from substances, or attached and attributed to substances. Yet because “being” is not a thing, because it is no-thing, it is the one and most singular excep- tion to the rule and law, as well as to the logic of substance, a rule and a logic that has come to

Journal

Research in PhenomenologyBrill

Published: Jan 1, 2003

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