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The Transcendental Self in Husserl's Phenomenology: Some Suggested Revisions1

The Transcendental Self in Husserl's Phenomenology: Some Suggested Revisions1 45 The Transcendental Self in Husserl's Phenomenology: Some Suggested Revisions1 GEORGE E. OBERLANDER The following was written partly in response to an article by Ludwig Landgrebe2 which, I believe, demonstrates that Husserl can not successful- ly motivate his phenomenological reduction due to a fundamental incon- sistency between his concepts of reflection and transcendental subjectiv- ity. I shall not review this article for it is a lengthy one. Rather, I would like to focus on the aspect of this concept of transcendental subjectivity which leads Husserl into this difficulty (and several other ones, besides), make clear just what is wrong with it and suggest development of another determination which I believe to be sounder both descriptively and theo- retically. It should be noted that the basis of this other determination is also to be found in the Husserlian corpus, but in a rather undeveloped state. The plurality of aspects in this concept was due, in part, to the very fluidity in Husserl's treatment and articulation of it, along with the developments and changes of emphasis to which he subjected it. Finally, I shall attempt to show that this revised concept of transcendental subjec- tivity makes possible the rational motivation http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Research in Phenomenology Brill

The Transcendental Self in Husserl's Phenomenology: Some Suggested Revisions1

Research in Phenomenology , Volume 3 (1): 45 – Jan 1, 1973

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1973 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0085-5553
eISSN
1569-1640
DOI
10.1163/156916473X00044
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

45 The Transcendental Self in Husserl's Phenomenology: Some Suggested Revisions1 GEORGE E. OBERLANDER The following was written partly in response to an article by Ludwig Landgrebe2 which, I believe, demonstrates that Husserl can not successful- ly motivate his phenomenological reduction due to a fundamental incon- sistency between his concepts of reflection and transcendental subjectiv- ity. I shall not review this article for it is a lengthy one. Rather, I would like to focus on the aspect of this concept of transcendental subjectivity which leads Husserl into this difficulty (and several other ones, besides), make clear just what is wrong with it and suggest development of another determination which I believe to be sounder both descriptively and theo- retically. It should be noted that the basis of this other determination is also to be found in the Husserlian corpus, but in a rather undeveloped state. The plurality of aspects in this concept was due, in part, to the very fluidity in Husserl's treatment and articulation of it, along with the developments and changes of emphasis to which he subjected it. Finally, I shall attempt to show that this revised concept of transcendental subjec- tivity makes possible the rational motivation

Journal

Research in PhenomenologyBrill

Published: Jan 1, 1973

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