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The Subject of Pain: Husserl’s Discovery of the Lived-Body

The Subject of Pain: Husserl’s Discovery of the Lived-Body The paper aims to develop a phenomenology of pain on the basis of the insights introduced in Husserl’s phenomenology. First, I suggest that pain is given to intuition as an indubitable and a bodily localizable experience. Since these two characteristics are incompatible with each other, I argue that the experience of pain is paradoxical . Second, I contend that philosophy of pain provides six ways to resolve this paradox: semiological, causal, associationist, representational, perceptual , and phenomenological . Third, my central goal is to develop the phenomenological resolution and to show that it culminates in the realization that the subject of pain is neither the disembodied consciousness nor the physiological body but the lived-body , conceived as the field of sensings . Fourth, I offer a phenomenological account of the structure of pain experience. I suggest that this structure could be characterized as the already appropriated body’s inner protest against its constitutive appropriation. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Research in Phenomenology Brill

The Subject of Pain: Husserl’s Discovery of the Lived-Body

Research in Phenomenology , Volume 44 (3): 384 – Oct 9, 2014

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0085-5553
eISSN
1569-1640
DOI
10.1163/15691640-12341294
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The paper aims to develop a phenomenology of pain on the basis of the insights introduced in Husserl’s phenomenology. First, I suggest that pain is given to intuition as an indubitable and a bodily localizable experience. Since these two characteristics are incompatible with each other, I argue that the experience of pain is paradoxical . Second, I contend that philosophy of pain provides six ways to resolve this paradox: semiological, causal, associationist, representational, perceptual , and phenomenological . Third, my central goal is to develop the phenomenological resolution and to show that it culminates in the realization that the subject of pain is neither the disembodied consciousness nor the physiological body but the lived-body , conceived as the field of sensings . Fourth, I offer a phenomenological account of the structure of pain experience. I suggest that this structure could be characterized as the already appropriated body’s inner protest against its constitutive appropriation.

Journal

Research in PhenomenologyBrill

Published: Oct 9, 2014

Keywords: Husserl; phenomenology; lived-body; pain; constitution

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