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The Refinement of the Concept of Constitution

The Refinement of the Concept of Constitution 19 The Refinement of the Concept of Constitution PINA C. MONETA In the words of Dorion Cairns: Second only to intentionality, the concept of intentive synthesis is the most important concept in Husserl's account of mental life. Intentiveness to things is synthetic in its most fundamental structure. On the other hand, any synthesis in the specific phemonenological sense of the term is ipso facto inten- tional. Among the various synthetic processes, Cairns repeatedly emphasized the importance of a fundamental clarification of the identifying and distin- guishing synthesis as the primordial constituting "activity" of conscious- ness. This clarification, he used to remark, was never carried out by Husserl. I have attempted to present here Cairns's analysis of the identifying and distinguishing synthesis within the content of consciousness's experience of inner time as lebendige Gegenwart.. By the peculiarly phenomenological synthesis at the root of consti- tuting processes Cairns means "a kind of union peculiar to intentive processes as such, the union by virtue of which in a multiplicity of life processes something is intended to as self-identical and non-identical with something else." In the genesis of constituting activity, identifying and distinguishing syntheses are "automatic" activities directly founded on retrotendings and http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Research in Phenomenology Brill

The Refinement of the Concept of Constitution

Research in Phenomenology , Volume 4 (1): 19 – Jan 1, 1974

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1974 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0085-5553
eISSN
1569-1640
DOI
10.1163/156916474X00043
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

19 The Refinement of the Concept of Constitution PINA C. MONETA In the words of Dorion Cairns: Second only to intentionality, the concept of intentive synthesis is the most important concept in Husserl's account of mental life. Intentiveness to things is synthetic in its most fundamental structure. On the other hand, any synthesis in the specific phemonenological sense of the term is ipso facto inten- tional. Among the various synthetic processes, Cairns repeatedly emphasized the importance of a fundamental clarification of the identifying and distin- guishing synthesis as the primordial constituting "activity" of conscious- ness. This clarification, he used to remark, was never carried out by Husserl. I have attempted to present here Cairns's analysis of the identifying and distinguishing synthesis within the content of consciousness's experience of inner time as lebendige Gegenwart.. By the peculiarly phenomenological synthesis at the root of consti- tuting processes Cairns means "a kind of union peculiar to intentive processes as such, the union by virtue of which in a multiplicity of life processes something is intended to as self-identical and non-identical with something else." In the genesis of constituting activity, identifying and distinguishing syntheses are "automatic" activities directly founded on retrotendings and

Journal

Research in PhenomenologyBrill

Published: Jan 1, 1974

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