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The Identities of the Things Themselves

The Identities of the Things Themselves 113 The Identities of the Things Themselves* JOHN SALLIS Duquesne University I want to take up, though in quite a different way, a question raised by Heidegger: What remains unthought in the appeal to the things themselves?' To the extent that Husserl's phenomenology is delimited by this appeal, I shall thus propose a critical orientation with respect to that phenomenology. Understanding critique as an establishing of limits, I want to suggest some steps that would transgress and thus expose certain limits of that appeal and of the project which it defines. The spirit of such critical reflection clearly is not foreign to Husserl's thought. Phenomenology could not even pose as fundamental science if it simply took itself for granted, if it failed to incorporate a dimension of self-reflection. Husserl well recognized that phenomenology must take seriously the need to reflect upon its own determinations, upon its own constitution as the fundamental scientific discipline. It is this need that installs within phenomenology a recurrent movement of return to beginnings and that makes of the phenomenologist a perpetual beginner. It is, then, such phenomenological self-reflection, such reflection on the phenomenological position and the project it generates, that I want to http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Research in Phenomenology Brill

The Identities of the Things Themselves

Research in Phenomenology , Volume 12 (1): 113 – Jan 1, 1982

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1982 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0085-5553
eISSN
1569-1640
DOI
10.1163/156916482X00071
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

113 The Identities of the Things Themselves* JOHN SALLIS Duquesne University I want to take up, though in quite a different way, a question raised by Heidegger: What remains unthought in the appeal to the things themselves?' To the extent that Husserl's phenomenology is delimited by this appeal, I shall thus propose a critical orientation with respect to that phenomenology. Understanding critique as an establishing of limits, I want to suggest some steps that would transgress and thus expose certain limits of that appeal and of the project which it defines. The spirit of such critical reflection clearly is not foreign to Husserl's thought. Phenomenology could not even pose as fundamental science if it simply took itself for granted, if it failed to incorporate a dimension of self-reflection. Husserl well recognized that phenomenology must take seriously the need to reflect upon its own determinations, upon its own constitution as the fundamental scientific discipline. It is this need that installs within phenomenology a recurrent movement of return to beginnings and that makes of the phenomenologist a perpetual beginner. It is, then, such phenomenological self-reflection, such reflection on the phenomenological position and the project it generates, that I want to

Journal

Research in PhenomenologyBrill

Published: Jan 1, 1982

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