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The Further Question: Frege, Husserl and the Neo-Kantian Paradigm

The Further Question: Frege, Husserl and the Neo-Kantian Paradigm The Further Question: Frege, Husserl and the Neo-Kantian Paradigm David Sullivan, Metropolitan State College of Denver After we have convinced ourselves that a boulder is unmovable, by trying unsuccessfully to move it, there remains the further question, what is it that supports it so securely. What’s wrong with psychologism? Sometimes it is thought that psychologistic thinkers commit something akin to the naturalistic fallacy, confusing ‘is’ and ‘ought’: psychology describes human thinking as it (actually) is, while logic prescribes how it ought (ideally) to occur. And sometimes it is imagined that such simple rejoinders exhaust what Frege has to advance on this same topic. Frege, accordingly, would deny that the laws of logic were “laws of what is” and instead would restrict them to “laws of what ought to be.” The laws of logic are, as are ethical strictures, prescriptive and, hence, outstrip mere description. The key contrast which emerges, on this account, is the one between the normative (or, prescriptive) and the factual (or, descriptive). But to rely on this simplistic account would be misleading, especially if what was wanted was a fuller understanding of Frege’s own rejection of psychologism. Such missteps, I claim, have received summary form: … http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis Brill

The Further Question: Frege, Husserl and the Neo-Kantian Paradigm

History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis , Volume 5 (1): 19 – Apr 5, 2002

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
2666-4283
eISSN
2666-4275
DOI
10.30965/26664275-00501006
Publisher site
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Abstract

The Further Question: Frege, Husserl and the Neo-Kantian Paradigm David Sullivan, Metropolitan State College of Denver After we have convinced ourselves that a boulder is unmovable, by trying unsuccessfully to move it, there remains the further question, what is it that supports it so securely. What’s wrong with psychologism? Sometimes it is thought that psychologistic thinkers commit something akin to the naturalistic fallacy, confusing ‘is’ and ‘ought’: psychology describes human thinking as it (actually) is, while logic prescribes how it ought (ideally) to occur. And sometimes it is imagined that such simple rejoinders exhaust what Frege has to advance on this same topic. Frege, accordingly, would deny that the laws of logic were “laws of what is” and instead would restrict them to “laws of what ought to be.” The laws of logic are, as are ethical strictures, prescriptive and, hence, outstrip mere description. The key contrast which emerges, on this account, is the one between the normative (or, prescriptive) and the factual (or, descriptive). But to rely on this simplistic account would be misleading, especially if what was wanted was a fuller understanding of Frege’s own rejection of psychologism. Such missteps, I claim, have received summary form: …

Journal

History of Philosophy and Logical AnalysisBrill

Published: Apr 5, 2002

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