Soviet Strategic Planning and the Control of Nuclear War

Soviet Strategic Planning and the Control of Nuclear War DESMOND BALL (Canberra, Australia) SO VIET STRA TEGIC PLANNING AND THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WAR Although the objectives of Soviet and U.S. strategic nuclear policy are superficially similar at the most general level-the deterrence of nuclear war and the limitation of damage to their military forces, economic structures, and polities in the event that deterrence fails-there are some very important differences in the employment policies and force postures which each has developed in pursuit of these objectives. Central to these differences are the assumptions which are held by the respective Soviet and U.S. strategic plan- ners regarding the controllability of nuclear war, and the approaches which each has taken to the design of their national strategic command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems.1 1 For more than two decades now, the overriding objective of U.S. strategic nuclear policy has been the development of a strategic posture which would enable the U.S. to control any nuclear exchange in order to limit damage at the lowest possible levels while ensuring that the outcomes are favorable to the U.S. The notion of "controlled response" which was developed by the Kennedy/McNamara Administration in 1961-62, and which governed the design of SIOP-63, the http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Soviet and Post Soviet Review Brill

Soviet Strategic Planning and the Control of Nuclear War

The Soviet and Post Soviet Review, Volume 10 (1): 201 – Jan 1, 1983

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1983 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1075-1262
eISSN
1876-3324
D.O.I.
10.1163/187633283X00090
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

DESMOND BALL (Canberra, Australia) SO VIET STRA TEGIC PLANNING AND THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WAR Although the objectives of Soviet and U.S. strategic nuclear policy are superficially similar at the most general level-the deterrence of nuclear war and the limitation of damage to their military forces, economic structures, and polities in the event that deterrence fails-there are some very important differences in the employment policies and force postures which each has developed in pursuit of these objectives. Central to these differences are the assumptions which are held by the respective Soviet and U.S. strategic plan- ners regarding the controllability of nuclear war, and the approaches which each has taken to the design of their national strategic command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems.1 1 For more than two decades now, the overriding objective of U.S. strategic nuclear policy has been the development of a strategic posture which would enable the U.S. to control any nuclear exchange in order to limit damage at the lowest possible levels while ensuring that the outcomes are favorable to the U.S. The notion of "controlled response" which was developed by the Kennedy/McNamara Administration in 1961-62, and which governed the design of SIOP-63, the

Journal

The Soviet and Post Soviet ReviewBrill

Published: Jan 1, 1983

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