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Scientific Time and the Temporal Sense of Human Existence: Merleau-Ponty and Mead

Scientific Time and the Temporal Sense of Human Existence: Merleau-Ponty and Mead 152 Scientific Time and the Temporal Sense of Human Existence: Merleau-Ponty and Mead PATRICK L. BOURGEOIS AND SANDRA B. ROSENTHAL Loyola University, New Orleans Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, so adamantly opposed to reductionism in behaviorism and physiological psychology, is often considered to be anti- scientific, while Mead's philosophy, as a pragmatism adhering to the model of scientific method, is frequently interpreted by phenomenologists to be rooted in a derived scientific level, thus removed from the phenomenological concern with lived experience. A consideration of the critical stance of each of these philosophers toward the past philosophic understandings of scientific time helps overcome the misinterpretation of each vis-?-vis science. For, it will be seen that within their differing philosophical orientations and tra- ditions, Mead and Merleau-Ponty alike utilize such a critical stance to work toward lived time as basic and as the source of all derived senses of time, thus providing a new philosophic understanding of the nature of scientific time. In so doing, Merleau-Ponty and Mead each oppose the realist view of an objective time structure independent of perspectives, as well as a subjectivist structuring of an inner stream over against a fixed objectivity. Rather, they each reach a level of http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Research in Phenomenology Brill

Scientific Time and the Temporal Sense of Human Existence: Merleau-Ponty and Mead

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1990 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0085-5553
eISSN
1569-1640
DOI
10.1163/156916490X00090
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

152 Scientific Time and the Temporal Sense of Human Existence: Merleau-Ponty and Mead PATRICK L. BOURGEOIS AND SANDRA B. ROSENTHAL Loyola University, New Orleans Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, so adamantly opposed to reductionism in behaviorism and physiological psychology, is often considered to be anti- scientific, while Mead's philosophy, as a pragmatism adhering to the model of scientific method, is frequently interpreted by phenomenologists to be rooted in a derived scientific level, thus removed from the phenomenological concern with lived experience. A consideration of the critical stance of each of these philosophers toward the past philosophic understandings of scientific time helps overcome the misinterpretation of each vis-?-vis science. For, it will be seen that within their differing philosophical orientations and tra- ditions, Mead and Merleau-Ponty alike utilize such a critical stance to work toward lived time as basic and as the source of all derived senses of time, thus providing a new philosophic understanding of the nature of scientific time. In so doing, Merleau-Ponty and Mead each oppose the realist view of an objective time structure independent of perspectives, as well as a subjectivist structuring of an inner stream over against a fixed objectivity. Rather, they each reach a level of

Journal

Research in PhenomenologyBrill

Published: Jan 1, 1990

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