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Rethinking Cooperation: Inequality and Consent in International Climate Change Politics

Rethinking Cooperation: Inequality and Consent in International Climate Change Politics Global Governance 21 (2015), 247–274 Rethinking Cooperation: Inequality and Consent in International Climate Change Politics David Ciplet This article analyzes how low-income state agreement has been produced for contemporary international climate change treaties. These treaties have dramatically weakened the legal framework for action on climate change, with likely unequal impacts in the poorest countries. The case demonstrates that theories of international cooperation are not fully equipped to explain the processes through which low-income states offer their consent to multi- lateral agreements. This article develops and applies to this case a neo- Gramscian framework of negotiated consent, which reveals three mechanisms in the production of low-income state consent: material con- cessions, norm alignment, and structural conditioning. This approach views international cooperation as a process of strategic power relations co- constituted by strong and weak states, in coordination with nonstate actors. As such, it is useful for bridging the agent-structure divide prevalent in co- operation theory and sheds light on the durable nature of inequality in in- ternational governance. KEYWORDS: cooperation theory, climate change politics, global environmental inequality. IT WAS 3 A.M. DURING THE FINAL PLENARY SESSION OF THE UN CLIMATE change negotiations in Copenhagen, 20 December 2009. Ian Fry, the http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations Brill

Rethinking Cooperation: Inequality and Consent in International Climate Change Politics

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1075-2846
eISSN
1942-6720
DOI
10.1163/19426720-02102005
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Global Governance 21 (2015), 247–274 Rethinking Cooperation: Inequality and Consent in International Climate Change Politics David Ciplet This article analyzes how low-income state agreement has been produced for contemporary international climate change treaties. These treaties have dramatically weakened the legal framework for action on climate change, with likely unequal impacts in the poorest countries. The case demonstrates that theories of international cooperation are not fully equipped to explain the processes through which low-income states offer their consent to multi- lateral agreements. This article develops and applies to this case a neo- Gramscian framework of negotiated consent, which reveals three mechanisms in the production of low-income state consent: material con- cessions, norm alignment, and structural conditioning. This approach views international cooperation as a process of strategic power relations co- constituted by strong and weak states, in coordination with nonstate actors. As such, it is useful for bridging the agent-structure divide prevalent in co- operation theory and sheds light on the durable nature of inequality in in- ternational governance. KEYWORDS: cooperation theory, climate change politics, global environmental inequality. IT WAS 3 A.M. DURING THE FINAL PLENARY SESSION OF THE UN CLIMATE change negotiations in Copenhagen, 20 December 2009. Ian Fry, the

Journal

Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International OrganizationsBrill

Published: Aug 19, 2015

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