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Prospects for Peircean Epistemic Infinitism

Prospects for Peircean Epistemic Infinitism Contemporary Pragmatism Vol. 6, No. 2 (December 2009), 71­87 Editions Rodopi © 2009 Scott F. Aikin Epistemic infinitism is the view that infinite series of inferential relations are productive of epistemic justification. Peirce is explicitly infinitist in his early work, namely his 1868 series of articles. Further, Peirce's semiotic categories of firsts, seconds, and thirds favors a mixed theory of justification. The conclusion is that Peirce was an infinitist, and particularly, what I will term an impure infinitist. However, the prospects for Peirce's infinitism depend entirely on the prospects for Peirce's early semantics, which are not good. Peirce himself revised the semantic theory later, and in so doing, it seems also his epistemic infinitism. 1. On the classical conception of knowledge, in order to know, you've got not only to believe something, what you believe has got to be true, and you've got to have a good reason as for why you believe it is true. But how do you know that's a good reason? It itself has not only got to be true, but you've got to have another reason for why you hold it is. And then for that reason, another. Then another. Then we're off http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Contemporary Pragmatism Brill

Prospects for Peircean Epistemic Infinitism

Contemporary Pragmatism , Volume 6 (2): 71 – Apr 21, 2009

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© Copyright 2009 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1572-3429
eISSN
1875-8185
DOI
10.1163/18758185-90000117
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Contemporary Pragmatism Vol. 6, No. 2 (December 2009), 71­87 Editions Rodopi © 2009 Scott F. Aikin Epistemic infinitism is the view that infinite series of inferential relations are productive of epistemic justification. Peirce is explicitly infinitist in his early work, namely his 1868 series of articles. Further, Peirce's semiotic categories of firsts, seconds, and thirds favors a mixed theory of justification. The conclusion is that Peirce was an infinitist, and particularly, what I will term an impure infinitist. However, the prospects for Peirce's infinitism depend entirely on the prospects for Peirce's early semantics, which are not good. Peirce himself revised the semantic theory later, and in so doing, it seems also his epistemic infinitism. 1. On the classical conception of knowledge, in order to know, you've got not only to believe something, what you believe has got to be true, and you've got to have a good reason as for why you believe it is true. But how do you know that's a good reason? It itself has not only got to be true, but you've got to have another reason for why you hold it is. And then for that reason, another. Then another. Then we're off

Journal

Contemporary PragmatismBrill

Published: Apr 21, 2009

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